EU Zombie Law: the CJEU re-animates the old 'third pillar'

 

Steve Peers

Back in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the EU began adopting measures on criminal law and policing under a peculiar institutional system, known in practice as the ‘third pillar’ of EU law. This system was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, and then survived several attempts to kill it over the next decade; indeed I once compared it to Rasputin. The Treaty of Lisbon nominally finished it off it as from that Treaty’s entry into force (1 December 2009); but this was subject to a five-year transitional period.

That makes it sound as though the third pillar finally came to an end on 1 December 2014 – but it did not. Indeed two judgments of the CJEU yesterday (here and here) not only maintain old third pillar measures in force, but allow new measures based on them to be adopted. Third pillar measures aren’t exactly dead yet – rather they are undead. Let’s take a look at these zombies of EU law.

Background

The Treaty of Lisbon has a transitional Protocol, which contains two rules relating to the third pillar. First of all, Article 10 sets out the five-year transitional period, after which the normal jurisdiction of the CJEU would apply to the measures concerned. At the same time, the UK could choose to opt out of all of these measures, and then opt back in to some of them, as it indeed did last year (see discussion here).

Secondly, Article 9 of that Protocol, which is not subject to a time limit, states that third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon stay in force until they are amended or repealed. Some of them have been amended or repealed, or will be soon (the law establishing Europol, for instance). But the majority remain in force, including the controversial law establishing the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).

Why does this still matter? First of all, the pre-Lisbon measures don’t confer direct effect on individuals, so can’t be invoked to create rights in national courts. Secondly, this means that the European Parliament (EP) has not had any real say in the adoption of these measures. In particular, the EP has a lot of excellent suggestions for the reform of the EAW. Thirdly, a legal question arises as to whether the pre-Lisbon measures can serve as a legal basis for the adoption of new measures even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This question was answered by yesterday’s judgments.

Judgments

The EP challenged the validity of post-Lisbon Council measures which had implemented pre-Lisbon EU criminal law acts, in particular giving police forces access to the EU’s Visa Information System and prohibiting some new designer drugs. There are parallel actions still pending, against measures implementing pre-Lisbon laws establishing Europol and the ‘Prum’ system of exchanging data between national police forces.

The reason for the EP’s objection to these measures was that the Council exercises these powers by means of a qualified majority vote, and argues that it does not have to consult the EP at all, since the legal requirement to consult the EP was set out in the old third pillar rules in the Treaty, which were repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon. In the EP’s view, the Council should use the post-Lisbon rules for the adoption of implementing measures, ie giving the Commission the power to adopt delegated acts over which the EP has control. Alternatively, fresh EU legislative acts have to be adopted; these would be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure.

The CJEU ruled that, in accordance with Article 9 of the transitional protocol, the pre-Lisbon measures remain in force. In the Court’s view, that also means that the Council is entitled to adopt implementing measures following the pre-Lisbon process. However, the Court, unlike the Advocate-General, said that the Council at least has to consult the European Parliament on these measures. It reasoned in effect that the cross-reference to the repealed Treaty rules in the pre-Lisbon legislation retained those rules in force.

Comments

The Court’s ruling in effect allows the Council to create new third pillar acts long after the third pillar has nominally died. It’s as if zombies could procreate, and give birth to baby zombies (I’m going for a ‘grossest legal analogy’ award here).  Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning as regards the EP’s partial victory means that to some extent, even aspects of the long-dead Treaty rules on the third pillar have now been zombified by the Court.

How much damage could these zombies do? There’s no risk of the famous ‘zombie apocalypse’ affecting EU law. Apart from these implementing measures, all other EU criminal law acts adopted since the Treaty of Lisbon have taken the normal EU form of Directives and Regulations, and have been subject to the post-Lisbon procedures (usually the ordinary legislative procedure). Many pre-Lisbon EU measures (such as the EAW law) don’t provide for implementing measures, and some of those which do (such as the Europol law, as mentioned already) will be replaced soon.

The Court’s rulings are a reasonable legal interpretation of the transitional rules. But the broader political problem remains: many controversial measures affecting civil liberties have had no real input from the EP. Since its resort to the courts has had only limited success, the EP should now consider alternative means (blocking legislation or budget disbursements) to achieve the goals of reviewing pre-Lisbon EU criminal laws – and in particular securing much-needed reforms to the EAW.

 

Photo credit: renewablenow.biz

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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The UK opts back in to the European Arrest Warrant - and other EU criminal law

 

Steve Peers

After much controversy, the UK today completed the process of opting out of EU criminal law measures adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and opting back in to some of them. This blog post looks as the legal framework for this process and the consequences of opting back in. It’s an updated version of a previous Statewatch analysis written this summer.

The Legal Framework

 

Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK was a full participant in almost all EU policing and criminal law measures. The exception was a small part of those measures ‘building on the Schengen acquis’, ie measures set out in, or amending, implementing or closely related to the Schengen Convention on the abolition of border controls. Most of those Schengen-related criminal law and policing measures applied to the UK from the start of 2005, except for the rules on cross-border hot pursuit by police officers (which the UK did not opt into) and the rules on the Schengen Information System (SIS) database (because the UK wanted to wait until a second-generation SIS was operational first, and this didn’t happen until 2013).

The Treaty of Lisbon changed the legal framework for the adoption of EU policing and criminal law, applying to this field the normal jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and, for the most part, the ordinary legislative procedure of the EU, which entails joint powers for the European Parliament and no vetoes for Member States in the Council.

The UK would only agree to these major changes in return for two forms of opt-out. The first opt-out relates to policing and criminal law measures adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This opt-out allows the UK to decide on a case-by-case basis, after each proposal is made, whether it seeks to opt in or out. If the UK initially decides to opt-out, it can always seek to opt in again (needing the Commission’s approval) at any time after the measure is adopted.

 

The second form of opt-out takes the form of a ‘block’ opt-out for those measures adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This was intrinsically linked to a five-year transition period concerning those measures, which is applicable to all Member States. That transitional period finally expired today.

 

This second opt-out is set out in Article 10 of Protocol 36 to the Treaties, which is set out in full in the Annex. The Article states first of all that the normal powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Commission did not apply for five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to pre-Lisbon third pillar measures. This meant that the Commission did not have power to bring infringement procedures against Member States to the CJEU regarding these laws until today.

Nor did the CJEU have jurisdiction over questions from national courts concerning EU law in this area, except where Member States had chosen to opt in to this jurisdiction (18 Member States opted in, and the Court delivered a number of judgments in this field). Also, the transitional rules cease to apply to an act which is amended after the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force, and a number of such acts were indeed amended.

Secondly, Article 10 of Protocol 36 set out a potential opt-out for the UK (but not for any other Member States) at the end of this five-year period. If the UK notified the Council by 1 June 2014, all the pre-Lisbon third pillar acts ceased to apply to it as of 1 December 2014, unless those acts have been amended and the UK has opted in to those amended measures. In this event, the Council could decide the ‘necessary consequential and transitional arrangements’, and could also decide that the UK has to ‘bear the direct financial consequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred’ as a result. In both cases, the Council acts by a qualified majority vote on a proposal from the Commission. The UK does not participate in the first of these measures (consequential arrangements), but would participate in the second (financial consequences).

Thirdly, the UK can seek to opt back into to some of the measures it has opted out of ‘at any time afterwards’. If it does so, then the rules for opting into Justice and Home Affairs measures in either the Protocol on the Schengen acquis or the Protocol on Title V (JHA measures) apply. In practice, that means that the Council, acting unanimously, decides on re-admission of the UK to measures building on the Schengen acquis (ie measures set out in, or amending, implementing or closely related to the Schengen Convention on the abolition of border controls), while the Commission (with no role for the Council, unless the Commission refuses the UK’s request) decides on readmission of the UK to pre-Lisbon third pillar measures which do not build on the Schengen acquis. The Protocol concludes by stating that in such a case, the EU institutions and the UK ‘shall seek to re-establish the widest possible measure of participating of the [UK] in the acquis of the Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, without seriously affecting the practical operability of the various parts thereof, while respecting their coherence’.

 

The block opt-out in practice

 

The UK government indicated in 2012 that it was inclined to invoke the block opt-out, and then seek to opt in to a number of measures. In 2013, it officially invokedthe block opt-out (well before the deadline of 1 June 2014), and indicated the 35 measures which it wished to opt back into. Informal negotiations then took place between the UK, the Council and the Commission, in particular during the Greek Council Presidency in the first half of 2014. The discussions were complicated somewhat by the UK’s request to begin participation in the second-generation SIS (known as SIS II) shortly before 1 December 2014, along with its request to amend the rules relating to SIS II alerts on the European Arrest Warrants in accordance with new EU legislation. Ultimately, the UK’s attempts to start applying the SIS this autumn were rejected, and it remains to be seen when it will begin to apply the system.

These negotiations were ultimately successful, and the Council Decision and Commission decision on the UK’s opt back in were adopted and published today.  The Council Decision amends the original Council Decision admitting the UK to participate in parts of the Schengen acquis, as well as the later Council Decision putting part of the Schengen acquis into force in the UK. The Council has published a codified textof the amended Decisions.

The crucial substantive point here is that the UK will continue to be committed to participating in the Schengen Information System, which provides for exchange of information on European Arrest Warrants, wanted persons and missing objects. It will also continue to be bound by the main criminal law and police cooperation provisions of the Schengen acquis.

As for the other measures, the Commission Decision approves the UK’s opt back in to almost all of the EU measures on mutual recognition in criminal matters (most notably the European Arrest Warrant), the creation of EU agencies (Europol, Eurojust) and exchange of information or databases, with a few exceptions: the Framework Decisions on mutual recognition of probation and parole decisions and the so-called ‘Prum’ Decisions on cross-border exchange of information on DNA, licence plate information and fingerprints.

On the latter issues, the transitional Decision(adopted last week) requires the UK to consider opting back in to the Prum Decisions by the end of 2015. If it does not do so, the financial consequences Decision(also adopted last week) requires the UK to pay back the money it received from the EU budget to prepare for putting the Prum rules into force. The UK agreed informally to consider opt back in to the Framework Decision on mutual recognition of probation and parole measures later. It will fall to the next UK government to decide on these issues (the next general election will be in May 2015), and it will always be open to the UK government to opt back in to more measures if it wishes.

There was some negotiation on the lists of measures which the UK sought to opt out of. As regards the Council Decision, one measure on the operational functioning of the SIS was added to the list. The Commission’s Decision included a decision to opt in to three measures implementing the Europol Decision, as well as the Decision establishing the European Judicial Network. These additional measures which the UK agreed to opt in to are essentially technical, except for the European Judicial Network, which the UK government believes is essentially a useless talking shop.

Also, it should be noted that some pre-Lisbon measures were amended while discussions were going on, in particular the EU’s Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters and its amending Protocol. The UK did not want to opt back in to these measures, but this objection is now moot, since the UK participates in the EU Directive on the European Investigation Order (discussed here), which has replaced some of the corresponding provisions of those measures. So this means that it continues to participate in the Convention and Protocol, without having to opt back in.

However, the UK government withdrew its request to participate in two measures (a Decision on a hate-crime network, and a Decision on special police intervention units) during the discussions. This decision may well have been taken so that the government can still claim that it is only opting back in to a total of 35 measures.

It should also be noted that the UK’s opt back in to some of the pre-Lisbon measures concerned could be very short-lived, since there are proposals to replace these measures which the UK has opted out of, but which have not yet been agreed. This is the case particularly with Europol and Eurojust. Negotiations are further advanced on the Europol proposal (see discussion here), where it looks as if the UK’s concerns may have been addressed, with the consequence that the UK would opt in to the future Europol Regulation after its adoption. However, it is too early to say if the UK might eventually opt in to the future Eurojust Regulation.

Other transitional issues

Finally, the EU institutions have tried to clarify the new legal position which applies from today. They have published in the EU Official Journal a list of ‘Lisbonised’ measures, ie pre-Lisbon third pillar acts which have been amended since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. There is also a list of acts which have just ceased to apply to the UK.

Following an analysis of which pre-Lisbon measures could now be considered obsolete, and which therefore could be repealed. just last week the Commission made three proposals to repeal 24 pre-Lisbon acts. I’ll come back to these proposals in the near future – but suffice it to say that they don’t go nearly far enough to simplify the very complex legal framework that applies in this area.

Further on the issue of transparency, it would be useful to have a list of post-Lisbon measures which apply to the UK. It would not unduly task the Council and/or Commission to make the effort to publish online a constantly updated list of the measures which do or not apply to the UK (as well as Ireland and Denmark, which also have opt-outs), so that the public and practitioners in the UK and elsewhere can easily discover which EU laws in this field apply to the UK, and which do not.

 
 Annex

Protocol 36, Article 10

1. As a transitional measure, and with respect to acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the powers of the institutions shall be the following at the date of entry into force of that Treaty: the powers of the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in force before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the same, including where they have been accepted under Article 35(2) of the said Treaty on European Union.

 

2. The amendment of an act referred to in paragraph 1 shall entail the applicability of the powers of the institutions referred to in that paragraph as set out in the Treaties with respect to the amended act for those Member States to which that amended act shall apply.

3. In any case, the transitional measure mentioned in paragraph 1 shall cease to have effect five years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

4. At the latest six months before the expiry of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 3, the United Kingdom may notify to the Council that it does not accept, with respect to the acts referred to in paragraph 1, the powers of the institutions referred to in paragraph 1 as set out in the Treaties. In case the United Kingdom has made that notification, all acts referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply to it as from the date of expiry of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 3. This subparagraph shall not apply with respect to the amended acts which are applicable to the United Kingdom as referred to in paragraph 2.

5. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the necessary consequential and transitional arrangements. The United Kingdom shall not participate in the adoption of this decision. A qualified majority of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may also adopt a decision determining that the United Kingdom shall bear the direct financial consequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation of its participation in those acts.

6. The United Kingdom may, at any time afterwards, notify the Council of its wish to participate in acts which have ceased to apply to it pursuant to paragraph 4, first subparagraph. In that case, the relevant provisions of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union or of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, as the case may be, shall apply. The powers of the institutions with regard to those acts shall be those set out in the Treaties. When acting under the relevant Protocols, the Union institutions and the United Kingdom shall seek to re­establish the widest possible measure of participation of the United Kingdom in the acquis of the Union in the area of freedom, security and justice without seriously affecting the practical operability of the various parts thereof, while respecting their coherence.

 

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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What just happened? The House of Commons ‘vote’ on the European Arrest Warrant

Steve Peers

Last night, the UK House of Commons voted in favour of the UK opting back in to 35 EU policing and criminal law measures, including the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Or rather, it didn’t: it voted in favour of the UK opting back to 11 such measures, notincluding the EAW. Amid scenes of parliamentary confusion and chaos, it wasn’t quite clear what was going on. This blog post explains exactly what the vote was about.

Background

I wrote a detailed analysis for Statewatch of the UK’s opt back in to EU policing and criminal law measures earlier this year, and I will write an update for this blog in the start of December once all of the final steps in the process are in place. But for now, here is a brief recap, to put last night’s vote in context.

The Treaty of Lisbon sets out a five-year transitional period for EU policing and criminal law measures adopted before that Treaty’s entry into force (1 December 2009). At the end of that period, those measures become subject to the full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, including both references from national courts and the Commission’s power to sue Member States for non-application, or incorrect application, of such measures. The majority of Member States (but not including the UK) had already opted in to the former jurisdiction, but the latter jurisdiction is entirely new.

From the same date, the UK can decide to opt out of all the pre-Lisbon policing and criminal law measures (except for those which have been amended since that Treaty entered into force, which the UK could decide to opt in to or out of individually as each of the amended versions was adopted).  If it exercises this block opt-out, the UK can then choose to opt back in to some of these pre-Lisbon measures individually. The decision on its application will be taken by the Commission or the Council, depending on the type of measure (the Council decides where the measure is linked to the ‘Schengen’ treaty on border controls; the Commission decides on all other matters, including the EAW).

The UK has indeed exercised the block opt-out, and has applied to opt back in to 35 measures, as described above. Last night’s vote was the crucial point at which the House of Commons got to vote on the government’s intentions (the House of Lords will vote shortly). The formal decisions on the opt-in will now be taken by the Commission and Council, probably on December 1.

While EU law sets out the overall procedure relating to the opt-out and opt-in, it doesn’t govern the details of parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s decisions within the UK. That’s a matter for  UK law only. So what exactly happened in the House of Commons last night?

The House of Commons vote

The UK government had long promised that Parliament would get to vote on the decision to opt back in to all of the 35 measures. In the event, the Home Secretary declared that last night’s vote, was in effect politically binding as regards all of these measures. But according to a ruling of the Speaker of the House of Commons, the vote was only legally binding as regards 11 of them.

What did the vote concern exactly? It was on a resolution to approve delegated legislation, ie an individual measure which the UK executive can adopt because a previous Act of Parliament gives it powers to adopt that measure, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Last night’s vote was the key point in that parliamentary scrutiny, as far as the House of Commons was concerned.

The Act of Parliament which gave the government those powers was the European Communities Act, which is the main Act governing the status of EU law in the UK’s national legal order. In particular, section 2(2) of this Act gives the government power to adopt delegated legislation to implement EU obligations, subject to certain limits. That section is very frequently used in practice.

However, it’s never been used before to adopt delegated legislation to implement EU obligations regarding pre-Lisbon policing and criminal law. That’s because it couldn’t be, before December 1 2014. This is due to a limitation in the Act itself. Because policing and criminal law issues were ‘intergovernmental’ (ie essentially decided upon by governments, not the EU institutions) before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, they took a different form, and had a different legal status, than ordinary EU law. To take account of this, the European Communities Act never applied to them until now (when the transitional period ends).  

The exclusion of these measures from the Act is implicit in the definition of EU law in section 1(2) of the Act. In particular, that definition excludes Title VI of the original Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) and Art. 1 of both the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice from its scope. Incidentally, the Act still continues to exclude EU foreign policy measures from its scope.

So what does the delegated act which MPs were voting on do? It takes the form of (UK) Regulations, and is further explained in an explanatory memorandum. It makes changes to UK law which the government deemed were still necessary to ensure that 11 of the 35 Acts which the UK is opting back in to are fully and correctly applied in our domestic law.

Six of those measures concern the UK’s mutual recognition of criminal law decisions adopted by other Member States (and vice versa), as regards: confiscation of assets obtained by crime; freezing of such assets provisionally during an investigation and trial; financial penalties (fines) imposed by courts as a result of a criminal conviction; the transfer of foreign prisoners serving a custodial sentence; general rules on in absentia trials as regards mutual recognition; and the European Supervision order, which permits foreigners to be freed pending trial, provided that their home State agrees to supervise them until they face trial in the country concerned.

Three more measures concern police cooperation. Two of them concern ECRIS, a system for the exchange of criminal records between Member States. The third concerns the so-called ‘Swedish initiative’, which governs requests for other forms of information in individual cases between  national police forces.

The final two measures concern joint investigation teams (groups of police officers from multiple Member States, as well as Europol, the EU police intelligence agency) examining cross-border crimes, and data protection rules applying to cross-border exchange of police information (this is distinct from the EU’s data protection Directive).

The political context

As noted above, the Commons vote applied to all 35 measures in a political sense only, not in a legal sense. Legally speaking, the government did not need parliamentary scrutiny of the opt in to the remaining measures, since there was no need to change UK law in order to apply them. However, the UK had promised such scrutiny nonetheless, leading to the confusion and disappointment of many MPs.

It was clearly right in principle to promise full parliamentary scrutiny of the opt in decision, given the public concern and interest in the issue. So it was wrong not to give full effect to that promise, which could have been implemented (for instance) by holding a vote also on a resolution explicitly concerning the opt in to all 35 measures.

The government may have decided not to do this because it wanted to avoid critics of the EAW trying to amend the resolution to force a vote on the EAW separately. But if there is enough concern in Parliament about the opt in to this particular measure (or any others on the list), then MPs should get the chance to vote on it individually.

One of the consistent problems with EU law in the UK (and to some extent in other Member States as well) is its perceived lack of democratic legitimacy. Often that’s the fault of the EU itself, due to a lack of transparency for instance. But in this case, since only UK law governs the process of parliamentary scrutiny relating to the opt in, it’s entirely the fault of the UK government. The likely result of the decision to limit the scope of parliamentary scrutiny will be to damage the legitimacy of the EU further – and to increase, not reduce, the number of Conservative MPs who are very critical of the EU.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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Letter to the Daily Telegraph: The need for the UK to opt in to the EAW

Steve Peers

The following is the text of a letter published in today's Daily Telegraph, and the subject of a  front page story in that paper (see also the web version), as well as the Guardian and BBC News websites. The vote in Parliament is scheduled for Monday 10th November. 

If you are a UK practitioner, academic, politician or NGO or and would like to add your name to this list of signatories, please tweet me at @StevePeers or e-mail me at speers@essex.ac.uk.  

For more details of the argument for opting back in, see the previous post on this blog. 

Dear Sir,

Parliament will soon face a crucial vote on the Government’s proposal to opt into certain EU measures. A key concern is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
 



Without the EAW other EU members may be unable speedily to extradite suspects like Hussain Osman or Jeremy Forrest to Britain - both in jail after use of the EAW. Unsurprisingly, the Association of Chief Police Officers believes we cannot afford to lose it.

Britain also risks becoming a safe haven for fugitives from justice – a handful of them British citizens, but the vast majority foreign nationals wanted for crimes elsewhere in Europe.

At home, recent statutory changes should help prevent extradition to long pre-trial detention overseas, and curb EAW use for trivial offences. Overseas, Britain can only lead reform of Europe’s criminal justice co-operation by being part of the system.


There is no credible alternative to the EAW. Other EU members will be reluctant to adopt new laws if we reject a system that works. Resort to international law on extradition would be slow and ineffective.

A vote to opt in will be a vote for security and for fair and effective criminal justice. 


Yours,

from the Legal Profession

Rt Hon Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers KG

Lord Carlile of Berriew CBE QC

Rt Hon Sir Henry Brooke CMG

Rt Hon Sir David Edward KCMG QC FRSE

Rt Hon Sir Anthony Hooper

Rt Hon Sir Francis Jacobs KCMG QC
Rt Hon Sir David Latham

Rt Hon Sir Konrad Schiemann

Andrew Caplen, President of The Law Society of England & Wales

Alistair Morris, President of The Law Society of Scotland

Evanna Fruithof, Consultant to The Bar Council

Jonathan Cooper OBE, Doughty Street Chambers

Richard Clayton QC, 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square

Tom de la Mare QC, Blackstone Chambers

Helen Malcolm QC, Three Raymond Buildings

Professor Philippe Sands QC, Matrix Chambers

from Law Enforcement and Civil Society

Lord Blair of Boughton QPM

Lord Harris of Haringey

Baroness Ludford, former Member of the European Parliament

Rt Hon Lord Roper

Rt Hon Charles Clarke

Andrea Coomber, Director of JUSTICE

Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform

William F Hughes CBE QPM, former SOCA Director General

Michael Kennedy CBE, former President of Eurojust, former COO at CPS

Peter Neyroud CBE QPM, former Chief Constable

from the Legal Academy

Professor John Spencer QC, Cambridge University

Professor Estella Baker, De Montfort University

Professor Patrick J Birkinshaw, Hull University

Professor Paul Craig, Oxford University

Professor Brice Dickson, Queen’s University Belfast

Professor Piet Eeckhout, University College London

Professor Angus Johnston, Oxford University

Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas, Queen Mary University of London

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

Nicola Padfield, Cambridge University

Dr Cian Murphy, King’s College London

Dr Veronika Fikfak, Cambridge University

Dr Alicia Hinarejos, Cambridge University

Dr Rebecca Williams, Oxford University

Hugo Brady, London School of Economics

Further signatories:

Fergus Randolph QC, Brick Court Chambers
Paul Garlick QC
Roger Smith, former chair of Justice
Daniel Sternberg, barrister
Carl Gardner, blogger, Head of Legal
Klentiana Mahmutaj, barrister
Thomas Garner, Gherson Solicitors
Shoaib M Khan, human rights lawyer
Charlie Edwards, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
Camino Mortera, Centre for European Reform
Dr Marianne Wade, University of Birmingham
Theodora Christou, Queen Mary, University of London
Professor James Chalmers, Glasgow University
Dr Egle Dagilyte, Bucks New University
Professor Tamara Hervey, University of Sheffield
Professor Ed Cape, University of the West of England
John Flood, Visiting Professor, University of Westminster
Dr Paul James Caldwell, University of Sheffield
Professor Geoff Gilbert, University of Essex
Matilde Ventrella, University of Wolverhampton
Dr Richard Ball, University of the West of England
Professor Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh 
Colm O'Cinneide, University College London 
Professor Geert van Calster, King's College London and barrister
Dr Sara Drake, Cardiff University
Josephine van Zeben, Oxford University
Alison Young, Oxford University
Dr Barbara Havelkova, Oxford University
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Oxford University
Professor Julie Dickson, Oxford University 
Dr Maria Fletcher, University of Glasgow
Helena Wray, University of Middlesex
Professor Laurent Pech, University of Middlesex 
Dr Noreen O'Meara, University of Surrey
Dr Mario Mendez, Queen Mary University of London
Claude Moraes, Member of the European Parliament 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25 

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The European Arrest Warrant: the case for the UK to stay in

Maria Fletcher, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Glasgow, and Steve Peers, Professor of Law, University of Essex

The UK government is currently making its final decision on which EU laws on criminal law and policing adopted before December 2009 that it wishes to opt back in to, as from 1 December 2014. The most controversial decision it has to make is whether to opt back in to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). In this blog post, we set out the case for opting back in to this law.

Background

As part of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Labour Government of the day secured a rather unique legal opt-out for the UK in relation to EU crime and policing matters, which takes effect on 1 December 2014 and which is known as the ‘Protocol 36 opt-out’. This was to be on top of the already secured position whereby the UK (and Ireland), by default, does not participate in the EU police and criminal justice (or asylum and immigration) agenda unless it chooses to opt in to individual measures on a case by case basis, either during the proposal stage or after their adoption.

The Protocol 36 opt-out, completely unprecedented in terms of scope and only available to the UK, entitles the UK to withdraw en masse from EU measures concerning police and criminal justice adopted prior to the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009 to be precise). In principle it is an all or nothing opt out in the sense that the UK must opt out of all of these pre-Lisbon measures, or none at all. But, in the event of its exercise, the UK also has the right, within limits, to opt back in to individual measures selectively.

The UK Government officially invoked the opt-out (of 130 measures) in July 2013 and simultaneously produced a list of 35 Pre-Lisbon measures it considered to be in the ‘national interest’ to rejoin. The Government then began negotiations with the European Commission and the Council to seek to rejoin that list of 35 measures – the terms of the Protocol requiring approval from one or other of those institutions depending on the precise nature of the measures. For measures linked to the EU’s ‘Schengen’ rules, such as the Schengen Information System database, the UK needs the consent of all Schengen States to opt back in. For other measures (the majority, including the EAW), the UK needs only the consent of the Commission.

According to the Protocol, the UK and the EU institutions must ‘seek to re-establish the widest possible measure of participation of the United Kingdom in the acquis of the Union in the area of freedom, security and justice without seriously affecting the practical operability of the various parts thereof, while respecting their coherence.’ The UK is therefore likely to be able to insist on opting back in to its chosen measures unless it is opting back in to only part of a package of measures that are deemed to be inextricably linked  (the coherence requirement) or it would be impossible or very difficult in practice for technical reasons to opt back in to one measure but not another (the operability requirement).

At the domestic level, scrutiny procedures by Parliament have been thorough, if fraught, due to the Government’s lack of timely information. The relevant committees of both the House of Lords and the House of Commons have conducted inquiries and produced numerous reports on this matter and both Houses have been promised votes on the overall package of measures to rejoin following the conclusion of negotiations with the Commission and the Council and on the basis of Impact Assessments. But time is running out, especially if the Houses are to be given enough time to reflect upon this important matter.

Although the timetable relating to the Protocol 36 opt-out is entirely out of the hands of the current government, the plain reality is that the timing could not have been worse. With Ukip on the rise and ostensibly gaining ground amongst the traditional Tory vote and now just months away from a general election, the government and in particular, the Conservative party, is seemingly running scared on the topic of Europe.

And one criminal justice measure in particular seems to be fuelling particular panic.

The European Arrest Warrant

The EAW has operated in the UK for a decade, and has made it onto the list of 35 that the Government wishes to rejoin as of 1 December 2014. It is without doubt the most high-profile and controversial of the EU’s criminal justice measures. In essence it provides a simple and speedy procedure designed to surrender people between EU states for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or spell in detention.  It works on the basis of mutual recognition, such that the authorities in the Member State in receipt of a warrant execute it (arrest and surrender the wanted individual) more or less automatically.

This way of cooperating amongst states – which is based on trusting the integrity of another state’s criminal justice system – was chosen, and indeed advocated, by the UK government of the time, precisely because it entailed the least intrusion by EU law into domestic systems. Rather, decisions or rulings by a criminal court in the UK must be accepted and enforced in any another Member State and vice versa.

It is widely recognised that the EAW has created a more efficient, simpler, quicker, cheaper, more reliable and less political system of extradition in Europe compared to its predecessor 1957 European Convention on Extradition (see the House of Lords committee analysis). Since 1 January 2004, when the EAW scheme came into force, the average time taken to extradite a suspect in cases with consent is just 17 days and in non-consensual cases it is has fallen from around a year to 48 days. The number of wanted persons surrendered to the UK in 2013 was 127, compared to 19 in 2004; and surrendered from the UK upon the request of all other EU Member States was 1126 in 2013 compared to 24 in 2004. Speaking on 9 July 2013 the Home Secretary said ‘[s]ince 2009 alone, the arrest warrant has been used to extradite from the UK 57 suspects for child sex offences, 86 for rape and 105 for murder. In the same period, 63 suspects for child sex offences, 27 for rape and 44 for murder were extradited back to Britain to face charges. A number of these suspects would probably have not been extradited back to Britain without the arrest warrant.

The success of the EAW might be illustrated by the extradition from Italy, in less than eight weeks, of Hussain Osman, who was wanted in connection with the attempted July 2005 London bombings; he was subsequently sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 40 years. More recently, Jeremy Forrest, the teacher who was sentenced in June 2013 for absconding to France with one of his pupils, was extradited back to the UK less than three weeks after his arrest.

 

Notwithstanding these positives, the EAW is not beyond criticism and the most serious two concerns are considered here. It is worth noting however that other criticisms of the EAW appearing in the public debate are, frankly, contrived to fuel anti-EU sentiment and fear. For instance, outrage that the EAW can be used by foreign courts to extradite Britons and in unacceptably large numbers is misplaced on two counts. First, the EAW does indeed require all Member States to surrender nationals, but unlike some other Member States, the UK had never treated nationality as a bar to extradition anyway. The UK had also removed the obligation of the requested State to show a prima facie case in respect of extradition requests coming from Europe, far in advance of the EAW abolishing the same.

And second, the UK may be being required to surrender increasing numbers of individuals to face prosecution under the EAW, but the overwhelming majority (96%) of those are not British nationals – and presumably, on that basis alone, there would not be much appetite to keep them here!

 

Turning then to the two particularly serious criticisms of the EAW.  First, it has resulted in a number of British suspects being surrendered to countries where they then face excessive periods in prison before trial – bail being notoriously difficult to attain as a foreign suspect. Any such instance is unhappy and unacceptable and it certainly fuels the critics who push for the UK’s withdrawal. But alternative options to improve the situation do exist and we would submit that they are preferable to opting-out. For one, the EAW legal instrument could be amended to permit the requested state to postpone the execution of the warrant until the issuing state is ready to proceed with trial, and the UK could push for this. Along these lines, recent amendments to UK law (see further below) mean that a suspect will not be handed over on the basis of an EAW unless he or she has been charged by another Member State.

Another route is to implement an EU measure which specifically tackles this problem - the so called ‘European Supervision Order’. Adopted in 2009, the ESO enables a suspect or defendant who has been granted a pre-trial non custodial supervision order (bail) in another Member State to be supervised in their home MS until such time as their trial takes place. This instrument would allow foreign suspects to be transferred home while awaiting trial and equally, UK nationals to return home while they are on bail. For sensible reasons therefore, this measure is among the 35 instruments which the current government is seeking to opt-back in to.

Finally, a longer term way of addressing the EAW problem is to address its root causes – namely to force those Member States whose criminal justice systems are deficient in these respects to improve the way they treat suspects and defendants. The UK government appears willing to participate partly in this agenda to ensure minimum standards of procedural safeguards to those who find themselves caught up in the criminal justice system (including victims) across the whole EU. To be sure, agreement on these issues across Europe is not easy, but it is a measure of the level of commitment to ensuring fairness and justice that efforts are made to secure appropriate safeguards and standards of protection in addition to securing speedy and effective prosecutions.

In any event, anyone who objects to the EAW on the grounds that it sometimes results in miscarriages of justice should hardly be among those calling for repeal of the Human Rights Act and the UK’s withdrawal from the ECHR, given that one of the main aims of both these measures is precisely to avoid miscarriages of justice. But in fact, the critics of the EAW are often also critics of the ECHR.

The second serious criticism of the EAW is its excessive scope, which enables it to be used in some cases that are trivial, or stale, or both. This causes a headache for UK law enforcement authorities, who must expend significant resource following up all warrants, including those for minor offences. This instrument was designed with serious crimes and organized criminality in mind and the absence of a proportionality requirement undermines this – although in practice a permissible ‘human rights’ requirement, which has been enshrined in UK legislation implementing the EAW, does mitigate the disproportionate impact.  It also worries those who speak for the interests of suspects and defendants.

This problem could be solved at EU level by amending the EAW legislation to include a proportionality requirement (which could be similar to the rules in the recently-adopted European Investigation Order). The European Parliament has also suggested that the EAW rules should incorporate such a rule (along with many other reforms). This issue could also be addressed by creating a workable system specifically for dealing with minor or so-called ‘disorganised’ criminality committed across borders.

Acknowledging that reform is needed, the Home Secretary has already acted upon her promise to pursue changes at the national level by amending the UK legislation implementing the EAW, the Extradition Act 2003, in order (among other things) to introduce rules on proportionality, to provide that a person will not be surrendered if he or she has not been charged, and to refuse to surrender persons if there are charges pending against them in the UK.

So, why then has the UK Government chosen to opt-back in to this measure? To put it simply, as a tool for law enforcement, the relevant UK authorities are convinced that it is, on balance, a good thing. The Association of Police Chief Officers has said that the EAW ‘gives us a stronger, more effective means of arresting dangerous criminals across borders and thus keeping our communities safe at home – it is not an instrument we can afford to lose.’ In fact the evidence amassed during the Protocol 36 parliamentary enquiries overwhelmingly supports retaining the EAW.

It is unlikely that the UK could continue to extradite suspects and criminals in the same way even if it opts-out of the EAW. Certainly it cannot be taken for granted that other Member States would be able to continue to send EAWs to the UK, or execute EAWs coming from the UK, as a matter of law – indeed their implementing legislation would preclude this if it refers only to the EU ‘mother’ legislation, and this would arguably be illegal as a matter of EU law. And any political will to change their arrangements might be stretched by the UK’s unilateral rejection of a previously unanimously agreed instrument, which, after all is supposed to be based on mutual trust.

In this event, extradition between the UK and other EU Member States would essentially fall back on traditional procedures agreed in 1957 under the auspices of the Council of Europe (a non-EU international organization that is most well known for the European Convention on Human Rights). Such procedures are discretion-based, follow a ‘request model’ and are subject to the ultimate control of the executive (making it a political rather than a legal matter). As compared to the EAW (as summarized above), these features combine to make it slow, costly and uncertain, potentially undermining public safety – an almost unthinkable backward step in the cross border pursuit of criminal justice.

It has sometimes been suggested that the UK could replace the EAW with an extradition deal with the entire EU, or with bilateral deals with individual Member States (see the suggestions on the Conservative Home website). While the EU has negotiated an extradition treaty with Norway and Iceland, this took years to negotiate and has not yet entered into force eight years after its signature. Furthermore, this treaty is nearly identical to the European Arrest Warrant. So this process is not efficient and would not free the UK from compliance with most of the EAW’s rules (which the critics of the EAW system dislike so much).

In any event, there is no time before the absolute deadline of 1 December for the UK to opt back in to the EAW to develop an alternative system. There is now little time even to draw up transitional rules which would govern the situation if the UK failed to opt back in on that date. In the absence of such transitional rules, there will be a doubtful legal basis for continuing to arrest, detain or surrender people who are sought by the UK in other Member States or vice versa as of that date.

More generally, having less stringent extradition laws in the UK than the rest of the EU would risk turning the UK into a sort of ‘Costa del Crime’, since criminals might be attracted to come here in light of the relative ease of not being extradited. Conversely, the rest of the EU would become a more attractive bolt-hole for anyone committing crimes in the UK, in particular those who flee to the state of their nationality and argue that they should no longer be extradited from that State (this was the common practice of continental Member States before the EAW was adopted).

It is certainly true that alarmist press coverage has fuelled a widely held belief that ‘Brussels’ is planning to impose on Europe a single, common uniform system of criminal justice. This quite simply is not the case in and furthermore, it cannot be the case under the existing legal framework – there is simply not the political appetite for this amongst the other 27 member state governments, who collectively and for the most part constitute ‘Brussels.’  Even the most potentially ‘intrusive’ EU criminal law measure – the creation of a European Public Prosecutor  - which is still at proposal stage, would only be able to investigate, prosecute and bring to justice those involved in offences against the Union’s own financial interests. The UK has opted out of this proposal, and any extension of its scope would be limited to ‘serious crime having a cross-border dimension’ and require the unanimous approval of all participating Member States and the European Parliament. 

Concluding remarks

The ‘in/out’ option that has emerged in domestic politics is crude and dangerous. The promise of a referendum along those lines by 2017 has seemingly set in train a period of frenzied, mis-leading and alarmist commentary. This intervention seeks to explain some of the basic legal facts and fiction around the UK’s position in relation to EU criminal law.

The Article 36 opt-out does not and cannot rid the UK of the entire EU criminal law agenda, even in the event that the UK Government chose not to exercise its right to seek to rejoin certain measures.  It cannot simply ‘walk away’ from EU criminal law. Any pre-Lisbon measures amended since 1 December 2009 and any new measures adopted since that date are not subject to the Protocol 36 opt-out. And the UK has already committed itself to many of these. This legal reality appears to have been misunderstood or ignored in much of the debate amongst those pushing for the exercise of the opt-out. The fact is that the Protocol 36 opt-out is less about repatriating powers from Brussels than about degrees of future participation in a system already in place. The UK is in a very privileged position in this sense and its ongoing willingness to engage in this agenda is to be welcomed in the interests of safety, security and justice for UK nationals, if nothing else.

The EAW is by no means perfect and reflection, review and reform should never be off the agenda. On balance we believe it to be a positive force and as such it is preferable to be ‘in’ it – with a chance to shape it – than ‘out’ of it. Much the same goes for the European Union itself.

Europe's leaders have recently reiterated their general commitment to accommodating different national positions on integration in the EU: ‘Our diversity is an asset, our unity brings strength. In our Union, different degrees of cooperation and integration exist.’ It would seem that there is a real future for even a typically skeptical United Kingdom in this very modern club of nations whose aims are to promote peace, the well-being of its peoples and its values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 2, chapter 25

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