EU foreign policy, human rights and institutional reform: questions for two Commission Vice-Presidents

By Emilio DE CAPITANI, Henri LABAYLE and Steve PEERS

This week, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will continue their questioning of the would-be members of the next European Commission, to determine whether to confirm the Commission in office. MEPs have already asked some written questions and the would-be Commissioners have replied. However, the oral hearings which will shortly take place are an opportunity for MEPs to ascertain the Commissioners’ plans, and to secure important political commitments.

The following blog post suggests some questions for MEPs to ask two of the proposed Commission Vice-Presidents, namely the would-be High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commission Vice President for external relations (Mogherini), and the would-be Commissioner for Better Regulation, Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law (Timmermans). The questions for Ms. Mogherini focus on institutional issues, since we assume that MEPs will not overlook the possibility to ask about substantive foreign policy issues.

QUESTIONS TO HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CANDIDATE MOGHERINI

1. External vs Internal Security Policy

In your written answer you claim the need of a consistent and global approach to external and internal security. However, legally these two dimensions have been artificially separated in the Treaties by a disconnection clause (art.40 of TEU; see the Annex to this blog post) according to which the external security will remain intergovernmental. This means that consensus between the 28 Member States will remain the main rule, there are no legislative powers and the Court of Justice has no full judicial oversight.

Bearing in mind these flaws of the EU external security policy (also from the point of view of the democracy principle and of the rule of law) would not be better to achieve some of your goals by building them on the external dimension of “internal” policies (such as protection of borders, migration, judicial and police cooperation)? If so qualified majority voting will be the rule and external agreements will be approved by the EP (as already happened with some EU-US agreements) and EU acts will be under the control of the Court of Justice…

2. Solidarity clause in case of terrorist attack or natural or man made disaster (art. 222 TFEU)

On a joint proposal of your predecessor and of the Commission on 24 June 2014 the Council adopted the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause (art 222 TFEU)  to be activated  if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The text has been adopted without associating the EP and moreover it does not foresee any structured information of the European Parliament on the way in which threats are defined and monitored, not even in the case that such an event occurs. However even if the Treaty does not impose a requirement to provide this information nothing would had prevented the Council from  foreseeing it on its own initiative also because it would be bizarre that the members of the EP discover a terrorist attack from the press rather than from institutional channels. 

Will you propose an amendment to that Decision by recognising an adequate space for the EP?

3. Global Approach to Migration and mobility partnership as a binding act

As you rightly say in your written answer, EU development policy and international agreements could be the answer to address the root causes of displacement. However the Global Approach of Migration and the mobility partnership are only diplomatic instruments and are meaningless if not framed as full international agreements.

Should they be transformed into legal binding acts (both for third countries and the EU and its Member States) and be accompanied by formal EU agreements with the relevant UN Agencies (UNHCR, IOM) tasking (and financing) them for the interventions in third countries?

4. Agreements on the exchange of confidential information with third countries

Since 2000 the Council of the European Union has concluded dozens of international agreements dealing with the exchange of confidential information with third states and international organizations. However, notwithstanding the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and of art 218(10) of the TFEU which requires that the European Parliament should be “immediately and fully informed” during the negotiations this never happened.

Even worse these agreements follow the same model (originally defined for the EU-NATO agreement) according to which the Council concludes the agreement on behalf of the European Union by granting to the other contracting party the right of vetoing the transmission of the classified information to any other third party, including the European Parliament.

Do you think that in compliance with the democratic principle inside the EU and the principle of loyal cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty these agreements should be amended?

5. Art 9 of Regulation 1049/2001 and future revision of the Agreement on the exchange of classified information

Art.9 of Regulation 1049/2001 frames in a very concise way the treatment of classified information as “confidential”, “secret” and “top secret”. However there is not yet a definition of the criteria to be followed for the classification/declassification.

As limits to fundamental rights should be founded on law and not on internal organisational rules (the so called EUCI rules) will you propose a revision of article 9 of Regulation 1049/2001 ?

The revision of the agreement on exchange of confidential information with the Council in the domains formerly covered by the second pillar is underway.

Will you accept an EP request for declassification in case after examination a document appears to be overclassified ?

6. International negotiations and provisional application

In principle the mandate for negotiations for an international agreement should indicate the envisaged legal base (see the CITESjudgment of the CJEU) but this has not been the case for the ACTA agreement, for the TTIP and currently for the EU-USA umbrella agreement on data protection.

Do you agree that this is an essential element for the legality of the mandate even if the legal basis could be updated on the basis of the result of the negotiations?

The signature of an international agreement not covering exclusively the CFSP requires the consent of the European Parliament. In case of mixed agreements (such for external trade) the provisional application could be foreseen and the EP will not have the chance to delay the application without rejecting the agreement itself.

Do you not consider that it would be more wise to submit to the EP two different draft Decisions covering respectively the agreement and its provisional application?

7. Consular Protection

Foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty the right to consular protection is still the “cinderella” of EU citizens’ rights, because of Member States’ reluctance to adopt even the Commission proposal to establish a solidarity mechanism in this area.

Will you try to convince the MS that it is even in their interest to adopt the Commission proposal?

QUESTIONS TO FRANS TIMMERMANS

Rather strangely the hearing in this case will not follow the EP’s very detailed internal rules (art.118 and Annex XVI of the EP’s rules of procedure; see the annex to this blog post) which require that the hearing should take place before the Parliamentary committees. Candidate Vice President Timmermans will instead be heard by the Conference of Presidents of political Groups.

1.Rule of law / implementation of EU law

The confidence of all EU citizens and national authorities in the functioning of the rule of law in the Member States is vital to increase the mutual trust and to further develop the EU into "an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers".

In your written reply you strongly support the recent Commission proposal for a “common rule of law framework (COM(2014)158 as repeatedly advocated by the European Parliament (but criticized by the Council legal Service). However such an exercise, which should cover all the EU member states, risk being meaningless if the Commission does not strengthen the mechanisms which implement the principle of sincere cooperation with and between the Member States. For instance there is no ground in the Treaties which justifies confidential meetings between the Commission and the Member States (even in the framework of the so called “EU Pilot mechanism”) when legal certainty on the exact scope of EU citizens rights and obligations are at stake.

As first steps to strengthen the rule of law would it not then be appropriate to:

- update the way that the Commission on a day-to-day basis debates with the Member States about the implementation of EU legislation?

- make public the Member States’ implementation plans as well as the table of correspondence between EU and national rules ?

- implement (five years after the Lisbon Treaty came into force!) Article 70 TFEU, providing for “objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies” as regards Justice and Home Affairs law, by keeping informed the European and national parliaments ?

- take stock every year of the rulings of the European Courts and of the measures taken at national level ?

2. Charter of Fundamental rights as a “roadmap” for the EU legislator ?

In a recent ruling  the Court of Justice struck down for the first time an EU Directive (the Data Retention Directive 2006/24) because “.., the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter. " According to the CJEU the Directive “..does not lay down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter” and moreover  “does not require the data in question to be retained within the European Union, with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured…” In other terms from now on the Court of Justice will require a strict assessment of the proportionality and necessity of measures that constitute serious restrictions to fundamental rights, however legitimate the objectives pursued by the EU legislature.

On the basis of this landmark ruling do you not consider your priority to revise, to ensure its proportionality, the legislation falling within the sphere of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Charter and of the Treaty of Lisbon ?

Will you commit to develop a stronger and more transparent strategy to deal with infringements of EU law where the rights in the Charter are threatened by a Member State's non-existent or incorrect implementation of its EU law obligations? 

Would it not be sensible, taking into account your attachment to the REFIT exercise, to establish “sunset clauses” for measures limiting EU citizens rights? Moreover, as regards data protection, do you not consider that this ruling raises even bigger doubts on the compatibility with the proportionality principle of the EU-US agreements on PNR and TFTP and of the legislative proposals submitted by the Commission on the EU-PNR and the “Entry-Exit” system (not to speak of the lack of compliance of the proposal on trusted traveller with the principle of non discrimination) ?

3 Better Regulation –interinstitutional agreement on codecision – Transparency

In your written answer you recognise that the current inter-institutional agreement on better law making has several flaws but you envisage its revision only by the end of 2015. However in the meantime some practices against the spirit and the letter of the Treaties could continue. For instance the Treaties make no reference any longer to the protection of the decision making process for legislative procedures and require public debates also at the Council level. Notwithstanding this new legal framework until now the Commission has done nothing to bring the Council and EP closer on the revision of Regulation 1049/2001 and create a sufficient majority within the Council (as former Dutch minister you should know this problem very well).

Will you, as a first priority, modify the 2008 Commission proposal on access to documents by taking as a basis Article 15 TFEU, Article 42 of the Charter and the position adopted by the European Parliament in December 2011?

As the Council has de facto imposed upon the other EU institutions, agencies and bodies its internal security rules as common standards for classified documents, would you not consider that the current situation violates the Treaty provision which requires a legislative measure to be adopted under art. 15 TFEU ?

4. Delegated / Implementing acts - Transparency

After the Lisbon Treaty the Commission, instead of applying on a case by case basis the implementation of the subsidiarity principle by defining policy by policy what should be considered basic rules, what could be considered non-essential (and therefore to be delegated) and what could be considered purely executive, has adopted a “horizontal” approach by taking as main reference the pre-existing types of Committees.

This “shortcut” has not only ignored the evolutions of different policies (as well as of the institutions’ roles) but it is also taking more time it could have, as compared to updating the EU legislative objectives in the light of the revised Treaties and of the Charter.

From a transparency perspective you state that you “will also consider whether the Commission could systematically publish draft measures at the point at which consultations with expert groups are due to start. This would allow the European Parliament and the Council as well as other stakeholders to express their views before formal adoption. The three institutions could discuss whether a dedicated Register could be part of the solution and depending on the conclusions reached, I would be ready to examine the feasibility of this option and its inclusion in the modernised inter-institutional agreement on better law-making”.

Are you aware that such an obligation already exists in Regulation 1049/2001 according to which “Wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are acting in their legislative capacity, including under delegated powers, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the institutions' decision-making process. Such documents should be made directly accessible to the greatest possible extent.” ?

5. Subsidiarity in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 

In your written answer you make reference to your initiative as former Dutch minister for external affairs on what the EU should do to comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. However according to the 54 recommendations adopted one year ago by your government the EU should be less ambitious, in the freedom security and justice area, on :

- consular protection for EU citizens abroad (even if since its establishment by the Maastricht Treaty this right exists only on paper)

- family reunification (where NL recommends higher age and civic integration requirements) 

- admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, etc.

(where NL considers that the categories of pupils in exchange programmes, unpaid interns, volunteers and au pairs should not be covered)

- proposals to harmonise the law of criminal procedure where NL considers that “legislation should not be ‘Lisbonised’ simply because the Treaty of Lisbon exists” and oppose “the introduction of legislative proposals purely on the grounds that the Council of Europe has already adopted a Convention on the same subject”. (NDR : So why they did bother ratifying the Lisbon Treaty and a binding Charter when the previous regime was already satisfactory and why bother with the EU if the Council of Europe suffices?) 

-  proposals to harmonise substantive criminal law (where NL challenges, for instance, EU proposals  enforcing criminal laws against identity fraud and customs law violations) and the revision of the money laundering legislation.

As a Vice President of the Commission will you maintain the same approach ?

6. EU agencies and their powers /accountability

In the last ten years the number of EU agencies has rocketed from 10 to 32, sometimes for sound technical reasons, but more often as a way for Member States to shape and manage EU policies without a real accountability before the Commission, the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Their global budget amounted in 2014 to 800 million euros, and with more than 6.000 officials they have become a parallel administration which acts in a rather fuzzy way without a clear legal administrative framework. The Common Approach to decentralised agencies (a “political” agreement reached in 2012 by the Council, Commission and European Parliament) has laid down some parameters on EU agencies’ establishment, hosting, human resources policy, transparency and accountability but as such is more of cosmetic nature. But what is more worrying is the fact that some of the agencies are becoming political agenda setting bodies. In the FSJA the role of Frontex and of Europol (managing the so called “policy cycle” which defines the EU priorities against crime) is self –explanatory.

How do you intend to re-establish a real binding administrative framework and improve the rule of law principles for these “independent” EU bodies?

You announced that you “will prepare a proposal for an Inter-Institutional Agreement creating a mandatory lobby register covering the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council”. As cases of conflict of interest have emerged will you add also the EU agencies to the register ?

  

ANNEX

Article 40 (ex Article 47 TEU)

The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.

The model agreement state “The EU institutions and entities to which this Agreement applies shall be: the European Council, the Council of the European Union (hereafter ‘the Council’), the General Secretariat of the Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service (hereafter ‘the EEAS’) and the European Commission.  For the purposes of this Agreement, these institutions and entities shall be referred to as ‘the EU”.

Rule 118 Election of the Commission

1. The President shall, after consulting the President-elect of the Commission, request the nominees proposed by the President-elect of the Commission and by the Council for the various posts of Commissioner to appear before the appropriate committees according to their prospective fields of responsibility. These hearings shall be held in public.

2. The President may invite the President-elect of the Commission to inform Parliament about the allocation of portfolio responsibilities in the proposed College of Commissioners in accordance with his or her political guidelines.

3. The appropriate committee or committees shall invite the Commissioner-designate to make a statement and answer questions. The hearings shall be organised in such a way as to enable Commissioners-designate to disclose to Parliament all relevant information. Provisions relating to the organisation of the hearings shall be laid down in an annex to these Rules of Procedure16.

4. The President-elect shall present the college of Commissioners and their programme at a sitting of Parliament which the President of the European Council and the President of the Council shall be invited to attend. The statement shall be followed by a debate.

5. In order to wind up the debate, any political group or at least 40 Members may table a motion for a resolution. Rule 123(3), (4) and (5) shall apply.

Following the vote on the motion for a resolution, Parliament shall elect or reject the Commission by a majority of the votes cast.

The vote shall be taken by roll call.

Parliament may defer the vote until the next sitting.

6. The President shall inform the Council of the election or rejection of the Commission.

7. In the event of a substantial portfolio change during the Commission's term of office, the filling of a vacancy or the appointment of a new Commissioner following the accession of a new Member State, the Commissioners concerned shall be invited to appear before the committees responsible for the areas of responsibility in question in accordance with paragraph 3.

ANNEX XVI Guidelines for the approval of the Commission

1.      The following principles, criteria and arrangements shall apply for making the entire College of the Commission subject to Parliament's vote of consent:

(a)        Basis for assessment

Parliament shall evaluate Commissioners-designate on the basis of their general competence, European commitment and personal independence. It shall assess knowledge of their prospective portfolio and their communication skills.

Parliament shall have particular regard to gender balance. It may express itself on the allocation of portfolio responsibilities by the President-elect.

Parliament may seek any information relevant to its reaching a decision on the aptitude of the Commissioners-designate. It shall expect full disclosure of information relating to their financial interests. The declarations of interest of the Commissioners-designate shall be sent for scrutiny to the committee responsible for legal affairs.

(b) Hearings

Each Commissioner-designate shall be invited to appear before the appropriate committee or committees for a single hearing. The hearings shall be held in public.

The hearings shall be organised by the Conference of Presidents on a recommendation of the Conference of Committee Chairs. The Chair and coordinators of each committee shall be responsible for the detailed arrangements. Rapporteurs may be appointed.

Appropriate arrangements shall be made to associate relevant committees where portfolios are mixed. There are three options:

(i)         if the portfolio of the Commissioner-designate falls within the remit of a single committee, the Commissioner-designate shall be heard by that committee alone (the committee responsible);

(ii)        if the portfolio of the Commissioner-designate falls more or less equally within the remit of more than one committee, the Commissioner-designate shall be heard jointly by those committees (joint committees); and

(iii) if the portfolio of the Commissioner-designate falls mainly within the remit of one committee and only to a small extent within the remit of at least one other committee, the Commissioner-designate shall be heard by the committee mainly responsible, with the association of the other committee or committees (associated committees).

The President-elect of the Commission shall be fully consulted on the arrangements.

The committees shall submit written questions to the Commissioners-designate in good time before the hearings. For each Commissioner-designate there shall be two common questions drafted by the Conference of Committee Chairs, the first relating to the issues of general competence, European commitment and personal independence, and the second relating to the management of the portfolio and cooperation with Parliament. The committee responsible shall draft three other questions. In the case of joint committees, they shall each be given the right to draft two questions.

Each hearing shall be scheduled to last three hours. Hearings shall take place in circumstances, and under conditions, in which Commissioners-designate enjoy an equal and fair opportunity to present themselves and their opinions.

Commissioners-designate shall be invited to make an opening oral statement of no longer than 15 minutes. Where possible, questions put during the course of the hearing shall be grouped together by theme. The bulk of the speaking time shall be allotted to political groups, mutatis mutandis in accordance with Rule 162. The conduct of the hearings shall aim to develop a pluralistic political dialogue between the Commissioners-designate and the Members. Before the end of the hearing, Commissioners-designate shall be given the opportunity to make a brief closing statement.

There shall be a live audio-visual transmission of the hearings. An indexed recording of the hearings shall be made available for the public record within 24 hours.

(c) Evaluation

The Chair and coordinators shall meet without delay after the hearing to evaluate the individual Commissioners-designate. Those meetings shall be held in camera. The coordinators shall be invited to state whether, in their opinion, the Commissioners-designate are qualified both to be members of the College and to carry out the particular duties they have been assigned. The Conference of Committee Chairs shall design a pro forma template to assist the evaluation.

In the case of joint committees the Chair and the coordinators of the committees concerned shall act jointly throughout the procedure.

There shall be a single evaluation statement for each Commissioner-designate. The opinions of all the committees associated with the hearing shall be included.

Where committees require further information in order to complete their evaluation, the President shall write on their behalf to the President-elect of the Commission. The coordinators shall take the latter's reply into consideration.

If the coordinators are unable to reach a consensus on the evaluation, or at the request of one political group, the Chair shall convene a full committee meeting. As a last resort, the Chair shall put the two decisions to the vote by secret ballot.

The committees' statements of evaluation shall be adopted and made public within 24 hours after the hearing. The statements shall be examined by the Conference of Committee Chairs and conveyed subsequently to the Conference of Presidents. Unless it decides to seek further information, the Conference of Presidents, following an exchange of views, shall declare the hearings closed.

The President-elect of the Commission shall present the whole College of Commissioners-designate and their programme at a sitting of Parliament which the President of the European Council and the President of the Council shall be invited to attend. The presentation shall be followed by a debate. In order to wind up the debate, any political group or at least 40 Members may table a motion for resolution. Rule 123(3), (4) and (5) shall apply.

Following the vote on the motion for resolution, Parliament shall vote on whether or not to give its consent to the appointment, as a body, of the President-elect and Commissioners-designate. Parliament shall decide by a majority of the votes cast, by roll call. It may defer the vote until the following sitting.

2. The following arrangements shall apply in the event of a change in the composition of the College of Commissioners or a substantial portfolio change during its term of office:

 (a)       When a vacancy caused by resignation, compulsory retirement or death is to be filled, Parliament, acting with dispatch, shall invite the Commissioner-designate to participate in a hearing under the same conditions as those laid down in paragraph 1.

(b)        In the event of the accession of a new Member State, Parliament shall invite the Commissioner-designate to participate in a hearing under the same conditions as those laid down in paragraph 1.

(c)        In the event of a substantial portfolio change, the Commissioners affected shall be invited to appear before the committees concerned before taking up their new responsibilities.

By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in paragraph 1(c), eighth subparagraph, when the vote in plenary concerns the appointment of a single Commissioner, the vote shall be by secret ballot.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 3, chapter 5, chapter 9, chapter 24

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The CJEU ensures basic democratic and judicial accountability of the EU’s foreign policy

 

Steve Peers

In today’s judgment in European Parliament v Council, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ensured that a minimum degree of democratic and judicial scrutiny applies to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The European Parliament (EP) was challenging the Council’s decision to sign and conclude (ie, ratify) a treaty between the EU and Mauritius, relating to the EU’s military operation as regards pirates in the Indian Ocean. As discussed further in the previous blog post concerning the Advocate-General’s opinion, one important aspect of this treaty (and similar treaties with other nearby States) was the inclusion of rules governing the transfer, trial and treatment of alleged pirates to Mauritius, once the EU caught them.

The dispute had two elements – substantive and procedural – which will be considered in turn.

Substantive issues

In the Council’s view, this treaty ‘exclusively’ concerned the CFSP. In that case, Article 218 TFEU (the clause which sets out the procedures for negotiating and concluding international treaties by the EU) states that the EP does not even have to be consulted. But in the EP’s view, it had the right of consent over this treaty, since it also touched upon issues of development policy and criminal and police cooperation. Article 218 provides that where a treaty concerns issues where the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure applies (such as those policy areas), the EP has a right of consent before a treaty can be concluded.

The Court assumed that the EP was not actually arguing that the EU/Mauritius treaty should also have been adopted by means of the development policy, police and judicial cooperation legal bases. So therefore it confined itself to ruling on a narrow legal point. Article 218 states that when a proposal to negotiate a foreign policy treaty is first made to the Council, the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP shall make recommendations where that treaty relates ‘exclusively or principally’ to the CFSP.

But the CJEU ruled that the different wording (‘exclusively or principally’ when recommending a negotiation, and ‘exclusively’ when concluding a treaty) was immaterial. In its view, the basic rule in Article 218 is an underlying parallelism between the internal powers of the EP and its external powers. So where it has an internal power of consent and control (for instance, pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure), the EP should have a corresponding external control over the conclusion of treaties.

This approach inevitably meant that the EP lost its substantive argument, since Article 36 TEU only gives the EP the power to be informed and consulted of the main elements of the CFSP.

The Court’s analysis contrasts with that of the Advocate-General, who assumed that the EP was arguing that the treaty should have had also the legal bases regarding development policy and police and judicial cooperation. (His interesting arguments were fully discussed in the previous blog post).

Procedural issues

The EP’s procedural argument was based on a new clause added by the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 218(10)), which states that the EP ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’. In this case, the Council had informed the EP of its decision to sign and conclude the agreement over three months after it had taken it.

But before the Court could rule on the merits of this argument, it had to rule on whether it had jurisdiction to consider it. Article 275 TFEU rules out the Court’s jurisdiction as regards the CFSP, except as regards sanctions on individuals or ‘legal base’ arguments.

Nevertheless, the Court asserted its jurisdiction, arguing that the rule in the Treaty was its ‘general jurisdiction’, and so Article 275 was a ‘derogation’ which had to be ‘interpreted narrowly’. So the Court did have jurisdiction to consider issues of procedure as distinct from substance, since the procedural legal basis for CFSP treaties is Article 218, ie a provision outside the scope of the CFSP rules as such.

The Court then ruled in favour of the EP’s main argument.  Unlike the Advocate-General, it reached the common-sense conclusion that a three-month delay in informing the EP did not constitute ‘immediately’ informing it. Publishing the treaty in the Official Journal was not enough, since the purpose of the information requirement was to ensure ‘democratic scrutiny’ by the EP, including as regards legal base issues. The failure to inform the EP was an ‘essential procedural requirement’, ie a ground to annul the act concerned under Article 263 TFEU, since it was ‘an expression of the democratic principles on which the [EU] is founded’.  

This information requirement applied even though the treaty in question concerned the CFSP, where the EP had no power of consent or even consultation. The Court emphasised that the information requirement applied to any sort of treaty, and to any stage of the procedure.

Comments

If the EP had won its argument on the substantive issues, it would have gained the power of consent over most foreign policy treaties, given their links (which the Treaties in fact require) with other aspects of EU external policies. It does appear that the EP was trying to argue a more general legal base point, and so the Court’s decision to confine itself to a more technical analysis is disappointing. If the Court had ruled on the substantive legal base arguments, it would have been its first clarification of the external scope of the EU’s policing and criminal law powers, and its first clarification of the scope of CFSP powers since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. So the missed opportunity is unfortunate. Perhaps next time, the EP will challenge a foreign policy treaty more unambiguously, so that its legal base arguments are decided on the merits.

It could have been argued that the exception (as regards CFSP) to the normal rule that the EP has consent or consultation powers over international treaties is also a ‘derogation’ from the normal rule which had to be ‘interpreted narrowly’, just like the rule limiting the Court’s CFSP jurisdiction. However, the Court adopted different rules of interpretation as regards these two issues. One could deduce that the Court is more concerned about asserting its jurisdiction than enhancing the EP’s rights.

But having said that, the Court’s ruling on the procedural point is quite significant. First of all, as regards its own jurisdiction, the Court’s ruling means that any CFSP measure can be litigated before it, as long as the legal arguments relate to a procedural rule falling outside the scope of the CFSP provisions of the Treaty (Title V of the TEU). For instance, it arguably means that the Court would have the power to rule on the compatibility of proposed CFSP treaties with EU law, since that jurisdiction is conferred by Article 218 TFEU and not expressly ruled out by Article 275. But such disputes might often include arguments about the substanceof the measure concerned (for instance, whether it would breach the EU’s human rights obligations), and it could be awkward to distinguish between procedural and substantive issues in practice.

Secondly, as for the EP’s information rights, the Court’s reference to ‘all types of procedures envisaged in Article 218’ surely means that the EP must be given information at least about the recommendations to start negotiations, the decisions to open negotiations, the negotiating directives, the suspension of agreements and the adoption of EU positions in bodies set up by agreements, since all of those measures are referred to in Article 218. This allows the EP to indicate its point of view on draft or planned treaties or measures implementing them at an early stage of the process, allowing for further democratic input into the treaty-making process.

More broadly, the CJEU quite rightly rejected the absurd view that a three month wait could constitute an ‘immediate’ notification.  It applied the literal interpretation of the Treaty rule (applying to all treaties, and to every stage of the procedure) as well as the purposive rule (advocated in the previous blog post), agreeing that the purpose of the rule was to ensure democratic scrutiny and to allow the EP to ‘make known its views’. As I previously pointed out in that blog post, such public scrutiny would be an opportunity to discuss, for instance, whether the country in question had a problematic human rights record, and therefore to influence public debate over whether the treaty in question ought to be concluded.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 5, chapter 24, chapter 25

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Assessing the new EU Council Guidelines on Freedom of Expression - online and offline

Professor Lorna Woods, University of Essex; co-author, Steiner and Woods, EU Law 

Yesterday the Council of the European Union adopted guidelines on freedom of expression.  As these guidelines were adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council, it is not surprising that they are aimed at implementation within the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, like the ten previous guidelines on issues such as torture, the death penalty and human rights defenders.  So, while the guidelines are ‘guided’ by the EU Charter, as well as any relevant EU treaty provisions, the principal sources referred to are the provisions in the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34 on Freedom of Expression.  The list of sources contained in the Annex is far wider, however. It is also worthwhile noting that there is some discrepancy between what the EU asks of others – especially would be Member States via the Copenhagen criteria applied to planned accession candidates – and the recent practice of its own Member States (whether that be Hungary or the United Kingdom).

The Guidelines follow what might be termed a standard human rights approach to freedom of expression: that is, that freedom of expression should be interpreted broadly and exceptions narrowly (referring to the list of possible exceptions set out in Article 19(3) ICCPR as well as Article 20(2) ICCPR, on hate speech) and subject to the tests of legality, necessity and proportionality.  In explaining the significance of freedom of speech, the Guidelines refer to the significance of that freedom (especially that of the media) in democracy, but they also refer to the human element: that speech is important for self-fulfilment and autonomy, including the development of one’s identity in society, and not just instrumentally in the search for ‘truth’ or the ‘right’ political answer – important though that may be. Having said that, much of the specific points relate to the role of journalism and the media, with the underpinning assumptions about the role of the media as watchdog of those in power. 

The guidelines also note the horizontal nature of freedom of expression – especially relevant in the context of the Internet and social media, when expression is not just about public institutions and the media speaking to a passive audience (which was the model for much of the previous case law) but also the right of individuals to speak to one another and to receive each others’ views. This point has been given a higher profile in the approach of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights than traditionally has been the case in relation to Article 10 ECHR and Article 19 ICCPR. Despite this emphasis, there is recognition of the both the relationship between privacy and freedom of expression and the tension between them. Interestingly, in this document the former aspect – through consideration of the impact of surveillance on speech - may have a higher profile than the latter.

The guidelines identify some areas of priority action, and in some respects these areas of action are no surprise, starting with the need to end the impunity of those who take action against individuals for exercising their right of freedom of expression – notably journalists and media workers. In addition to condemning such actions, the EU will apparently call on the relevant state actors to take action against such threats of violence as well as violence itself.  If the EU does take action, it may provide incentives for some governments to take note of the UN General Assembly resolution on the subject, as well as the Action Plan to end impunity. In the tools section, the guidelines provide:

Abusive restrictions on freedom of expression and violence against journalists and other media actors should be taken into account by the EU when deciding on possible suspension of cooperation, notably as regards financial assistance.

This is a proposal that some involved in the campaign against impunity have been suggesting for some time.  How it works in practice remains to be seen.

The Guidelines identify the need to ensure that laws are not used to suppress freedom of expression, and that media regulation is appropriate to ensuring freedom of expression. Note that some of the points in this section go further than the regulatory position required of the Member States of the EU, specifically as regard the independence of regulatory bodies. While the EU’s communications package and the data protection regime expect that there be independent regulatory bodies, there is no such provision in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, and there is little transparency of media ownership – both to be encouraged according to these guidelines.

The Guidelines also note the importance of freedom of expression in cyberspace, and in particular focus on the need to ensure non –discriminatory access to the Internet – though there is less detail on what this actually means beyond support for the multistakeholder model of Internet Governance – as set out by EU strategies, rather than those identified in the Internet Governance Forum or Netmundial, although engagement with these is envisaged in the tools for action. The Guidelines do note the role of private companies, and set out best practice guidelines reflecting back the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, as understood through the EU guidance note for ICT companies on business and human rights.

The first action point, however, is ‘action at the international level to develop best practices and respect for human rights with regard to the export of technologies that could be used for surveillance or censorship by authoritarian regimes’.  The position as regards the United States is not addressed. The significance of the need to protect against excessive surveillance is, however, repeated and its adverse effect of freedom of expression noted.  Thus the guidelines specify that EU action will include the promotion of ‘the exchange of good practices to ensure that the legislation and procedures of States regarding the surveillance of communications and the interception and collection of personal data are based on the rule of law, subject to independent, effective and domestic oversight mechanisms and uphold obligations under international human rights law, including the principles of proportionality and necessity’, something which some Member States may need to think about.  The call to comply with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on exports of specified military technology does not add much, but the statement that ‘the EU will ensure a structured and consistent approach to export controls of certain sensitive information and ICT items’ is potentially far reaching, though what is envisaged by this statement is unclear. Is there a concern about mobile technology that has had back doors engineered into it (at the request of certain Western governments) for example? The next sentence refers however to specific surveillance/censorship technology, suggesting a far narrower field of concern.

Finally, the Guidelines contain plans for evaluation, specifically envisaging a report in three years’ time. While some aspects may show signs of fitting in with global concerns – such as the concerns about the violence against journalists now high on the UN’s agenda or the global revulsion at mass surveillance, it remains hard for the EU successfully to preach certain behaviours when its own Member States have at best a patchy record in these areas.


Barnard & Peers: chapter 9, chapter 24

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Pirates of the Indian Ocean: Legal Base and Democratic Debate

Steve Peers

Despite their central role in the world of EU law, legal base disputes often confound those outside the fairy-tale duchy of Luxembourg and the Brussels beltway, in particular when everyone agrees as to the substance of the issue concerned. And indeed, everyone agrees that the pirates in the Indian Ocean are a bad thing (except, presumably, the pirates themselves), and that the EU should establish (as it has done) a military action to combat them.

But what happens if the EU force catches the pirates? No-one wants the pirates coming to Europe to be tried, and it wouldn’t do to send them to Guantanamo. It would certainly be ironic if they could be forced to walk the plank, but that would violate their right to life. So they must be handed over to nearby countries in East Africa, for prosecution in those states, and everyone agrees that the EU must negotiate agreements to this end with the countries concerned.

One such treaty is between the EU and Mauritius, and the European Parliament (EP) has challenged the Council’s decision to conclude it on two separate grounds: the wrong legal base, and a failure to inform the EP sufficiently (Case C-658/11). The Advocate-General’s opinion, delivered today, is worthy of detailed analysis.
  The legal base issue: foreign policy, or development and judicial cooperation? 

The Council believes that the treaty with Mauritius concerns the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) alone, while the EP believes that the treaty concerns also judicial cooperation and development. In this case, the choice of legal base has far greater consequences than usual. Either way, the treaty had to be agreed unanimously by the Council, since both parties agree that it concerns foreign policy at least in part. But if the Council is right, and the treaty only concerns foreign policy, then: the EP did not even have to be consulted; the treaty had to be negotiated by the EU foreign policy High Representative; and the CJEU has no jurisdiction (except the jurisdiction to rule on whether the Council used the right Treaty base, as in this case: see Article 275 TFEU). If the EP is right, then: the EP had the power of consent over the treaty; the treaty had to be negotiated by the Commission; and the CJEU has its full usual jurisdiction.

 The Advocate-General first of all examines the EP’s arguments based on the precise wording of Article 218 TFEU, which specifies that the EP must consent to or be consulted about all treaties to which the EU will become a party, unless those treaties ‘relate exclusively’ to the CFSP. In his view, this rule simply echoes the legal distinction between the ‘legal bases’ of the CFSP and other EU policies, and so does not create a separate rule relating to the conclusion of external treaties.

 Then the Advocate-General turns to the heart of the issue: which legal base applies? In his view, taking account of the overall legal context, including Security Council Resolutions addressing the threat to international security posed by the pirates and the EU’s military action to combat them, the treaty is a CFSP measure. In particular, the CFSP measure providing for the military action contains rules on the possible transfer of the pirates to third States, including human rights protection. That EU measure would not be effective without treaties with third States regulating the transfer of those pirates.

Also, the treaty falls within the scope of the CFSP due to its objectives, which include (from the EU’s general external relations objectives) the requirements that the EU act in order to: ‘safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’; ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’; ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’; and ‘promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ (Article 21(2) TEU). In the Advocate-General’s view, these ‘are among those [objectives] that are traditionally assigned to the CFSP’ and ‘essentially correspond’ to the CFSP objectives as they were set out in the Treaties before the Treaty of Lisbon. The activity of transferring pirates also falls within the scope of the defence policy provisions of Articles 42 and 43 TEU, which refer to the use of ‘civilian and military’ assets.

The Advocate-General also rejected the use of the EU’s powers concerning criminal judicial cooperation. In his view, the external use of the EU’s justice and home affairs powers must ‘have a close link with freedom, security and justice within the Union’, namely ‘a direct link between the aim of the internal security of the Union and the judicial and/or police cooperation which is developed outside the Union’. This was distinct from a CFSP measure which had the objective of, ‘first and foremost, peace, stability and democratic development in a region outside the Union’. In this case, transferring pirates to East African states was too far removed from the development of the EU’s justice and home affairs policies. Finally, the Advocate-General rejected the use of the EU’s development policy powers, since the assistance which the EU gives to Mauritius is linked only to the application of the rules on the transfer of pirates, which constitute (in his view) a CFSP measure.

Is this first part of the opinion convincing? Some parts are more convincing than others. Certainly, the treaty should not have a legal base relating to development policy, since the assistance being provided is purely ancillary to the transfer of pirates. But this begs the question of the legal base which should apply to the transfer of pirates.

It makes sense to apply the same legal base rules to the conclusion of international treaties as apply to the adoption of internal legislation, since the Treaty drafters have forged a strong link between those two facets of EU decision-making. On the other hand, while it is true to say that a treaty containing rules on the transfer of pirates is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the military operation which catches them, it does not necessarily follow that it has the same legal base. For example, for the EU’s patent legislation to be effective, there need to be rules on patent translation and the creation of a patent court. But the patent translation rules were adopted pursuant to a different decision-making rule, and the patent court will be established pursuant to a treaty between Member States. The legal base of the treaty with Mauritius should depend only on the content of the specific rules in the treaty with Mauritius. 

Here, the arguments are finely balanced. The Advocate-General makes a persuasive case that EU military operations can use civilian assets, and that the EU’s justice and home affairs powers can be used externally only where there is a sufficient link to the EU’s internal rules in this area. Incidentally, this line of argument strangles at birth the idea (floated, as it were, by Italy) that an EU foreign policy measure could establish a military action in the Mediterranean to control immigration towards the EU. The link between such an action and the EU’s immigration, asylum and border control powers is blindingly obvious.

On the other hand, with great respect, the Advocate-General’s analysis of the EU’s general external relations objectives is not fully convincing. True, the first and third of the four objectives he refers to (safeguarding values, et al, and preserving peace, et al) previously appeared in Article 11 TEU, which set out the CFSP’s objectives prior to the Lisbon Treaty. But the reference to the promotion of an international system based on cooperation and good governance is new, as is the general reference to the principles of international law; and these objectives are obviously applicable to any form of external action by the EU, whether it concerns the CFSP, judicial cooperation, development or anything else. As for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they were indeed previously referred to in Article 11 TEU. But they were (and are) also a foundational value of the entire EU legal order (see now Article 2 TEU, and previously Article 6(1)), and are in part specifically referred to in the Treaty rules governing justice and home affairs and development cooperation. So this line of argument is ultimately not very persuasive.

Nor is the Advocate-General’s reference to the urgency of measures on this issue. The complications which the EU institutions face in their external action which result from the external relations rules in the Treaties simply can’t change the analysis regarding the legal base of those treaties (see Opinion 1/94, as regards the WTO). Anyway, the Council has the power, according to Article 218 TFEU, to decide to apply a treaty provisionally as soon as it signs it on behalf of the EU. Therefore the involvement of the EP in concluding the treaty would not compromise the urgency of achieving the treaty’s ends in any event.

So which legal base should apply? In my view, this should be determined on the basis of a teleological argument which the opinion does not consider. In the SEGI case, decided in 2007 (Case C-354/04), the Court of Justice ruled that an EU measure which imposed sanctions upon individuals could not be adopted in the form of a Common Position, a third pillar legal act which resembled a CFSP measure with a similar name. This approach ensured a minimum degree of democratic participation and judicial review at EU level of acts which directly imposed sanctions upon individuals. The same logic should apply by analogy here.

In fact, the Court should go further still. The elevation of the EU’s Charter of Rights to the ‘same legal value’ as the Treaties suggests that there should be a new approach to the resolution of legal basis and other institutional conflicts. Where relevant, if there is any ambiguity about the choice between possible legal bases or decision-making processes, the Court should ensure that EU measures concerning human rights should be decided by means of whichever process ensures the maximum possible parliamentary input and judicial control. It has already followed this approach in a case involving the powers of Frontex and national authorities to intercept vessels (C-355/10 EP v Council), and should confirm it as a fully-fledged new norm of interpretation. It is hardly necessary to point out how that rule should be applied in this case, as regards a treaty designed to ensure that criminal suspects who are in the hands of the EU receive a fair trial and basic human rights protection against torture and the death penalty when handed over to a third country.

Failure to inform the European Parliament

The Advocate-General’s conclusion on the first issue is reasonably argued, but his opinion on the second issue, with great respect, is deeply objectionable. The starting point as regards this issue is Article 218 of the TFEU, which specifies that the EP ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’ relating to the EU’s international treaties. Remember those words in italics! The Advocate-General, sadly, did not.

First of all, the Advocate-General rejects the Council’s argument that the CJEU has no jurisdiction to examine the application of this rule as regards CFSP treaties. In his view, even where the substance of a treaty concerns the CFSP, the CJEU can examine the validity of the procedure used to adopt it, despite the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the treaty as such (besides legal base arguments).

This is a fine line, but his argument has merit. If the CJEU had no jurisdiction, the EP’s procedural rights would be unenforceable as regards CFSP treaties – and those are the only rights it has as regards such treaties. And the CJEU can rule on those procedural rights without entering into any interpretation of the substance of those treaties, thus respecting the jurisdictional limit set by the Treaty drafters. It should follow by analogy that the CJEU would have jurisdiction under another provision of Article 218 to rule in advance on the compatibility of planned CFSP treaties with EU law.

Next, the Advocate-General argues that while the obligation to inform the EP applies to CFSP treaties, the EP should get more information, more quickly, where a treaty does not concern the CFSP, in light of the EP’s greater role regarding the conclusion of such treaties. Conversely it can receive less information, more slowly, as regards CFSP treaties.

How much was the EP informed as regards this treaty? When the Council decided to open negotiations, it informed the EP on the same day. That was certainly immediate. But the next time the EP heard from the Council was three months after the treaty was signed. This was one month after the publication of the decision to sign it in the Official Journal!

Shockingly, for the Advocate-General, this is sufficiently ‘immediate’. One is tempted to ask how many months he would be willing to wait to get served in a restaurant, or to use a toilet. With great respect, this is not, using any conceivable canon of interpretation, a plausible interpretation of that word. Put simply, no-one would consider a person who kept us waiting three months to be acting ‘immediately’.

As for the full information of the EP, the Opinion argues that because this was a CFSP treaty, the EP did not have to be informed of the progress of negotiations.

Let’s go back to the wording of the rule. First, a textual interpretation. Unlike the rules regarding the negotiation and conclusion of treaties by the EP, it makes no distinction between CFSP and other treaties. So prima facie, the two types of treaties must be placed on the same footing as regards information for the EP. 

Secondly, a contextual interpretation. The Advocate-General’s view of this rule is that it is designed to supplement the EP’s subsequent role as regards concluding the treaty concerned. But the Treaty makes no such link expressly. So the difference in wording between this rule and the rules on the EP’s role in concluding treaties suggests that it has a different purpose: to facilitate democratic debate as regards any planned treaty.

Of course, the amount of information which can be disclosed in public concerning a planned treaty in the midst of negotiations might be limited by confidentiality concerns, but these are addressed by agreements between the institutions concerned. Disclosing information to the EP as regards a planned treaty allows the EP to express its opinion, either privately to the Council or following a public debate, about whether a particular planned treaty is a good idea in principle. For instance, it should surely be a matter for public debate whether a particular country which the EU plans to transfer pirates to has a good record as regards fair trials, treatment of prisoners and the use of the death penalty. Of course, the EP’s influence may be limited as regards draft CFSP treaties because it will not get to vote on them. But why add insult to injury, and prevent it from holding an informed debate and expressing an informed opinion until (three months) after the treaty has been signed?

 If anything, the context of CFSP treaties suggests that the EP should have more information, not less, than as regards other treaties. After all, the EP has a formal role as regards the conclusion of other treaties, usually the power of consent. So if the EP only finds out at a late stage that a draft treaty contains something which it finds objectionable, it can veto that treaty. Whereas, as regards a CFSP treaty, the EP’s only chance to influence its content will be before its signature and conclusion.

Finally, what does it mean to require ‘full’ information ‘at all stages’ of negotiations? This obviously applies to decisions (including agreements in principle) to open negotiations, initial treaties, sign treaties, provisionally apply them, and conclude them. Given the wording and purpose of the Treaty rule, it also should apply to proposals to negotiate treaties, the progress of treaty negotiations, the denunciation of treaties and to EU actions within bodies established by treaties.


Barnard & Peers: chapter 24

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