The legal challenge to ECB restrictions on Greek bank accounts – and how you can help

Steve Peers

Many EU citizens have watched with sympathy and concern as Greek citizens have been limited to withdrawing €60 a day in the last two weeks. This restriction results from a restriction imposed by the European Central Bank (ECB) on the emergency liquidity assistance which it provides to Greek banks.  

Apart from the human impact, there are grave legal, political and economic doubts about the ECB’s action. One of the central purposes of a central bank is to function as a lender of last resort to banks – and the ECB is signally failing to do that here. Also, the ECB’s actions give the impression that it is trying to influence the Greek political debate on austerity and membership of the Eurozone – a role which is well outside the Bank’s remit. The banking restrictions obviously damage the Greek economy, and so limit its ability to pay back its creditors in future.  They have nothing to do with the Bank’s task of fighting inflation, and they undermine its broader role in supporting the EU’s economic growth. (For a fuller critique, see here (paywalled); on the legal background, see here). Arguably these restrictions – or further restrictions which the ECB might impose – could lead toward a de facto ‘Grexit’ from monetary union, which is ruled out by EU law (see my discussion here).

It’s possible to challenge the ECB’s actions via the national courts, which can refer the issue to the CJEU, such as in the recent Gauweiler case (discussed here). They can also be challenged in the EU courts, such as in the UK’s recent successful challenge (discussed here). The case law takes a broad view of what ECB acts can be challenged, except where it acts as part of the ‘Troika’ which negotiates bailout conditions, when neither the Bank nor the Commission can be challenged in the EU courts. But the ECB’s restriction of assistance to Greek banks did not fall within the scope of its role in the Troika.

National governments such as Greece can go directly to the EU courts to challenge ECB actions. Other challengers besides the EU institutions would have satisfy standing rules: ‘direct and individual concern’, or (if they are challenging a non-legislative act which does not entail implementing measures) ‘direct concern’. Arguably it would be easy for a Greek bank to satisfy those rules.

In the absence of a legal challenge from a Greek bank or the Greek government, an individual depositor has brought a legal challenge to the ECB’s recent actions before the EU General Court. You can find the full text of the claim here. The ECB might restore assistance if there is a deal in the near future, but it is still worth challenging its actions, so it cannot do this (or threaten to do it) in future.

Obviously there is a possible problem with standing, although a parallel challenge could be brought in the Greek courts. The plaintiff welcomes any advice or support – contact info@alcimos.com. Or you can leave comments on this blog post.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 19

Photo credit: www.2oceansvibe.com

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The financial services industry and the European Central Bank: the UK has won a battle, but can it win the war?

 

Steve Peers

Until yesterday, two trends seemed consistent in the jurisprudence of the EU courts. First of all, the UK kept losing cases relating to the interests of its financial services industry: on short-selling (discussed here), the financial transactions tax (discussed here) and bankers’ bonuses (discussed here). Secondly, the UK kept losing cases concerning its opt-outs from EU law (for instance, on social security and the immigration opt out, see here).

However, yesterday’s judgmentof the EU’s General Court on the UK’s challenge to the European Central Bank (ECB) policy on securities clearing systems bucks both trends. What are its implications for the UK's financial services industry, and for the UK's relationship with the EU?

The judgment

The UK challenged a ‘Policy Framework’ published by the ECB, which set out the role of the ‘Eurosystem’ (the ECB and the national central banks of Eurozone states) as regards payment, clearing and settlement systems. Sweden supported the UK, while Spain and France supported the ECB; the Commission stayed neutral. The UK objected to the Policy Framework provisions which stated that any central counterparties (CCPs) that held more than 5% of the credit exposure for one of the main euro-denominated product categories had to be legally incorporated and fully controlled from within the euro area. This would inevitably mean that a portion of the financial services industry which was traditionally located in the City of London would have to move to one or more Eurozone financial markets instead.

First of all, the judgment examined the admissibility of the action. The General Court rejected the ECB’s argument that its Policy Framework was not a reviewable act, ruling that despite its apparent soft law form it would perceived as a de facto binding policy and would be applied by Eurozone regulatory authorities in practice. Also, the Court ruled that the UK had standing to bring a legal action against acts of the ECB, despite its opt-out from the single currency.

Secondly, the Court ruled on the substance of the case. It was only necessary to rule on one of the UK’s five arguments against the validity of the Policy Framework: that the ECB lacked competence to adopt a measure on the location of CCPs. (The other arguments concerned Treaty free movement rules, competition law, non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and proportionality).

The ECB had claimed a power to regulate on the basis of Article 22 of its Statute, which takes the form of a Protocol attached to the Treaties, and states that the Bank ‘may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and with other countries’. Also, the Bank referred to Article 127(2) TFEU, which gave it the task ‘to promote the smooth operation of payment systems’, and the ECB’s general objective of maintaining price stability and supporting general economic policies, as set out in Article 127(1) TFEU.    

In the Court’s view, however, these powers only extended to the ability to regulate ‘payments’ in the narrow sense, ie the ‘cash leg’ of clearing operations, not the ‘securities leg’, since securities do not in themselves constitute payments. Article 22 of the ECB Statute could only apply to payment systems with a clearing stage, rather than all clearing systems, in the absence of any explicit reference to the clearing of securities. The Court also rejected the ECB’s argument that it had an implied power to regulate such issues, since such implied powers only existed ‘exceptionally’.

Finally, the Court concluded by sketching out (in effect) a ‘roadmap’ to change the current situation. Acknowledging that there are ‘very close links’ between payment systems and securities clearance systems, and that disturbances affecting securities clearance can affect payment systems, it stated that Article 129 TFEU could be used to amend the relevant provisions of the ECB Statute to extend the Bank’s powers in this field. So it suggested that the ECB could trigger that amendment process by requesting the EU legislature to amend the Statute.

Comments

The essential elements of the Court’s judgment (which could still be appealed to the Court of Justice) are convincing. From the perspective of accountability, the ECB should not be able to adopt ‘policy frameworks’ with quasi-mandatory language that will likely be applied in practice, as a means of evading the judicial review that would certainly apply if it adopted those rules (as its Statute specifies) in the form of regulations. Nor is it acceptable that the ECB could adopt measures with an impact on non-eurozone Member States and deny those countries standing to sue it, especially when the Treaties (as the Court pointed out) contain no limits on such standing.

As for the substance of the case, the Court is surely right, in the interests of accountability, to say that EU institutions’ implied powers have to be interpreted narrowly. There have been five major Treaty amendments in thirty years, and so there have been plenty of opportunities for Member States to decide what powers ought to be conferred upon EU institutions, and what powers should not. In the absence of an express conferral of power, the cases where the institutions have implied powers should be very exceptional indeed.

However, the Court takes an unusually narrow approach to the interpretation of an express power, namely the possibility for the ECB to regulate ‘clearing and payment systems’ as set out in its Statute. It is not self-evident that this provision can only apply to the ‘cash leg’ of clearing systems, especially in light of the links between payment and securities systems, and the impact of disturbances affecting securities clearance, which the Court expressly acknowledges.

This key aspect of the ruling can only be understood in light of the broader political context of this case. If the ECB had won, that result would have been widely regarded in the UK as a carte blanche for the ECB to split up the single market in financial services, as part of a broader ‘ganging up’ of Eurozone Member States against non-Eurozone Member States, in particular the UK. This would have been a rather hyperbolic reaction, since an ECB victory would not necessarily have had an impact beyond the specific issue of securities clearance, and the Eurozone Member States do not gang up as easily as is sometimes imagined: witness the current relationship between Greece and Germany, for starters. Nevertheless, it’s no wonder that the judges believed it would be wiser to hand this hot potato back to the politicians.

It’s striking, though, that the judges’ roadmap to give the ECB more powers is particularly easy to follow. The use of Article 129 TFEU to amend the ECB Statute only requires a proposal from the Commission or a recommendation of the ECB, followed by the ordinary legislative procedure, entailing joint power for the European Parliament and a qualified majority vote in Council. Although all Member States would have a vote, Eurozone States (if they do gang up together on this point) can now outvote non-Eurozone States.  The UK would have to seek alliances, rather than threaten vetoes, to block such a move. The referendum requirement in the UK’s European Union Act 2011 wouldn’t apply (see s. 10(1)(b) of the Act; the requirement for parliamentary approval there is meaningless, since the UK could be outvoted). Indeed, the UK would need the backing of some Eurozone States, as well as all non-Eurozone States, to block such a Treaty amendment. This would entail, for instance, securing the support of countries like Poland, at the same time as the UK (whichever of the two largest parties forms the biggest part of government after the next election) seeks to cut back the rights of Polish workers.

Failing that, the UK could bring a legal challenge to the Treaty amendment, or the ECB measure implementing it, invoking again its arguments concerning the internal market, competition law, discrimination and proportionality, which were not addressed in the General Court’s judgment. There’s a strong case to be made that the valid objective of regulating securities clearance effectively could be ensured by collaboration between the ECB and the Bank of England, rather than forcing some part of the financial services industry to move from the UK to the Eurozone, but the UK could not count on the EU courts accepting it.  

What are the broader implications of this judgment for the UK’s role in the EU? First of all, it weakens the pro-Brexit argument that ‘we should leave the EU because the Eurozone Member States are ganging up on us’. For now, the UK has won this battle, and it’s only a hypothetical possibility that it will lose the war later on. Secondly, it weakens the argument that ‘the City of London would be perfectly fine after Brexit’. If that were true, then why were Eurosceptics poised to make an unholy fuss if the UK had lost this case? Indeed, if the UK were not in the EU, it would not have had the privileged standing to sue the ECB, and the government (or British securities firms) would have had to go through national courts in the Eurozone to challenge this policy instead. Moreover, it might be harder to invoke the other arguments which the UK made in this case (and would have to make in future), depending on what legal arrangements governed the EU/UK relationship after Brexit.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 19

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Catharsis or catastrophe: what next for Greece and the Eurozone?

 

Steve Peers

Yesterday the anti-austerity party Syriza won a large victory in Greek elections and seems certain to become the government, probably in coalition with a smaller party. What is the likely impact upon the EU’s economic and monetary union?

The starting point is Syriza’s election platform. As discussed in more detail in this Open Europe blog post, that party’s aim is not to leave the EU or even the single currency, but rather to renegotiate Greece’s debts and the related austerity obligations. In particular, it wants part of Greece’s debt to be forgiven, and the terms of the remaining debt to be renegotiated, along with an abolition of the austerity demands made upon Greece as condition of previous bail-outs.

But whatever the political and economic arguments for this programme, it potentially faces some legal hurdles. There are limits on forgiving debt or ending austerity, as set out in the EU Treaties and the case law of the CJEU, which I discussed in a previous blog post (which this post updates).

In particular, according to Article 136(3) TFEU, any financial assistance to a eurozone Member State must be subject to ‘strict conditionality’. This is consistent with the CJEU ruling in Pringle, which stated that the ‘no-bailout’ rule in the EU Treaties (Article 125 TFEU) allowed Member States to offer each other financial assistance on the condition that it took the form of loans, rather than a direct assumption of Greek government debt by other Member States. Moreover, the CJEU pointed out, the ESM Treaty (the treaty between eurozone Member States which governs bail-outs) required that in the event of non-payment, the loans would remain payable, and had to be charged an appropriate level of interest.

So it’s not possible for Member States to drop all conditionality as regards loans to Greece, to forgive debt as such or to loan money interest-free. But it is open in principle to reduce the stringency of the conditions somewhat, to reduce the interest rates payable and to lengthen the repayment period – although there is always the risk that some litigant will try to convince a national court or the CJEU that this is going too far. Moreover, the rules in the EU Treaties only bind EU institutions and Member States, not private parties, third States or international organisations (although it might be argued that Member States are constrained as members of the IMF not to violate the no-bailout rule indirectly). So any renegotiation or default as regards such creditors is not subject to EU law rules in principle, although of course other legal rules might be applicable.  And as the Open Europe analysis points out, the bulk of the debt is owed to the Eurozone.

The case law does not rule out a short period of non-repayment of principal or interest, as long as the loans remain payable and subject to interest. Nor does it specifically address the possible conversion of loans into bonds, as some in Syriza have suggested.

Overall, it’s hard to see how the relatively modest renegotiation which EU law would permit would do enough to reduce Greece’s mountain of debt significantly, or to satisfy the voters which supported a Syriza-led government.

The renegotiation of loans might not be the only possibility to help out Greece. For example, arguably the Treaties do not rule out a form of (supplementary) unemployment insurance system as between Eurozone Member States, or support for another Member State’s social spending, as long as it would not take the form of paying off another State’s debts as such.

There is the ultimate possibility of leaving the euro, either at the behest of Greece itself or the other eurozone Member States. As I pointed out in the previous post, it isn’t legal to leave the Eurozone (or to force a Member State out) without that State leaving the EU. On that point, while it’s open to any Member State to leave the EU, it’s not legal to force a Member State out. At the end of the day, though, the European Central Bank holds the trump cards, since it could force a Member State to leave monetary union in practice by stopping the supply of money to that State. The independence of the ECB prevents politicians from ordering the bank to take such a radical step, but it might act on its own initiative.

Quite apart from its very dubious legality and severe economic effects, such a move would be a huge political mistake. The result might not be an increase in support for those moderate parties that reluctantly supported austerity, but rather for the far-right neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, which came third in the elections.

The better course for the EU is to take this opportunity to re-engage with the millions of EU citizens who are affected or angered by austerity, and re-orient the EU towards ending that austerity, instead of generating more of it. Although this is more easily said than done, it should never be forgotten that the initial rationale for the EU was not austerity, but economic growth which raised living standards for the population as a whole. So in voting for a party which promised the latter, Greeks have reaffirmed, not rejected, the Union’s traditional raison d’etre, reminding it that the Union cannot maintain its social or political legitimacy if it becomes no more than a mechanism for enforcing austerity.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 19

Cartoon: Economist.com

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Is the ECB’s OMT programme legal? The Advocate-General’s Opinion in Gauweiler

 

 

Alicia Hinarejos, Downing College, University of Cambridge; author of The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (forthcoming, OUP)

 

 

On the 14^thof January, AG Cruz Villalon delivered his Opinion in Gauweiler (C-62/14) on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) scheme of the European Central Bank (ECB). In his view, the OMT programme is, in principle, in compliance with the Treaties, as long as certain conditions are observed if the programme is activated in the future. The case has important implications for the constitutional framework of EMU and the role of the ECB, but also for the relationship between the German Constitutional Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the Court of Justice of the EU. Indeed, this is the first time that the Bundesverfassungsgerichthas ever asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

 

Background

 

The ECB is in charge of conducting monetary policy for the euro area and its role is very narrowly defined in the Treaties. This role, however, has evolved and expanded substantially in recent years, as the ECB has announced or adopted various ‘non-standard’ measures in response to the euro area sovereign debt crisis. The OMT programme is one of these measures: it was announced in September 2012 in a press release and, so far, it has never been used.

 

The idea is that the ECB will buy government bonds from euro countries in trouble, i.e., when nobody else buys these bonds, or their yield is becoming so high that the Member State will not be able to cover interest payments on newly issued bonds, thus having no more access to credit and risking default. Crucially, the Treaty prohibits the ECB from acquiring government bonds directly (Art 123 TFEU) as this would amount to monetary financing, or becoming a direct lender of last resort to a Member State. Instead, the ECB would buy government bonds in the secondary market—that is, from an institution that has bought these bonds first from a Member State—rather than from a Member State directly. While the ECB had already done this before, with the OMT programme there would be a formal element of conditionality as well, as the Member State in question would need to obtain financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism or the EFSF and comply with its conditions (i.e. macroeconomic reforms negotiated between the Member State and the troika: the Commission, the ECB and the IMF).

 

The applicants before the German Court argued that the ECB had overstepped its Treaty role by creating a programme that should be viewed as a tool of economic, not fiscal, policy; it was also alleged that the programme violated the prohibition of monetary financing. In an exercise of ultra vires review, the German Constitutional Court’s preliminary response was to consider the OMT programme illegal under EU law. For the first time ever, the national court then referred the case to the CJEU. In the referring court’s view, the Court of Justice may either declare the OMT scheme contrary to the EU Treaties, or provide a more limited interpretation of the programme that is in accordance with the Treaties. The German Court provided certain indications as to what those limits should be.

 

The case is sensitive for various reasons: although not yet used, the mere announcement of the OMT scheme played an important role in getting the euro area out of the acute phase of the crisis, and offers a credible defence against similar future scenarios. A declaration of illegality, or the placing of substantive limits on the programme, may jeopardise post-crisis recovery. Additionally, the reference is the first ever submitted by the German Constitutional Court, and its tone is quite bold; there is clear potential for conflict between the two courts, with consequences unknown for EMU (on this aspect of the case, see this earlier blog post). Moreover, the case touches on the nature and legitimacy of the role of the ECB as an independent expert, and on the dichotomy between the original, rule-based conception of EMU and the evolving, more policy-oriented EMU that rose out of the crisis.

 

The AG Opinion

 

AG Cruz Villalon delivered a carefully argued Opinion that, first, acknowledged and unpacked the significance of the exchange for the dialogue between the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice, and, second, considered all concerns put forward by the national court. In doing so, the AG came to the conclusion that the ECB is free to create and implement a scheme like OMT, as long as it abides by certain limits in doing so. Crucially, these limits are far more permissive than those suggested by the German Court.

 

(1)    The relationship between the two courts

 

The German Constitutional Court has been very vocal on the question of limits to European integration, vowing to exercise its ‘emergency jurisdiction’ in different scenarios in the past: in order to protect human rights enshrined in the German Basic Law (Solange saga), to ensure that EU action is not ultra vires, i.e. does not go beyond what is allowed in the Treaties (Maastricht, Honeywell), and to protect Germany’s constitutional identity, which has so far included a particular conception of democratic legitimacy and the protection of national parliamentary powers (Lisbon and various post-crisis decisions).

 

In Gauweiler, the case at stake, the German Court exercised its ultra viresjurisdiction, coming to the interim conclusion that the ECB’s actions went beyond the powers given to it in the Treaties. Following its undertaking in Honeywell, the German Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice before reaching a final decision. Space precludes more careful consideration of this point, but it should be noted that ultra vires and constitutional identity intertwine in this case: first, because the German court used its conception of democratic legitimacy to ‘sharpen’ its ultra vires jurisdiction, in the sense that, for the first time, it was citizens’ right to vote that gave them standing to challenge EU action for going beyond EU primary law. And second, because the German Court went on to suggest that further review on the basis of constitutional identity would or may follow a Court of Justice’s decision that the OMT scheme is not in fact ultra vires: whether the OMT scheme could violate the constitutional identity of the Basic Law would depend on the Court of Justice’s specific interpretation of the scheme in conformity with EU primary law.

 

AG Cruz Villalon engaged with the case-law of the referring court on limits to European integration and acknowledged the background and significance of a reference that was worded in very bold (some would say almost aggressive) terms by the German court. Indeed, this discussion may be seen as the most diplomatic part of the Opinion.

 

The AG emphasized the ‘functional difficulty’ of the reference: in short, that the Court of Justice should not issue a preliminary ruling requested by a national court if that request ‘already includes, intrinsically or conceptually, the possibility that it will in fact depart from the answer received’ [36]. This, the AG continues, is not the intended or proper use of the preliminary ruling procedure. But was this such a situation? In this respect, it is problematic that the German Court may still conduct its own and independent ‘identity review’ after the Court of Justice has conducted its ultra vires review. Nevertheless, the AG relied on the principle of sincere cooperation to argue that trust is required in this situation: the Court of Justice should provide a constructive ruling, ‘on the basis of a particular assumption regarding the ultimate fate of its answer’ [66]. So there we have it: since both courts are under a duty to cooperate sincerely and to trust each other, the Court of Justice should give the requested ruling to the German court, trusting that the latter will, in turn, ‘do the right thing’. The AG was very clear as to what he considered that to be: ‘it seems to me an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described as ‘constitutional identity’. That is particularly the case if that ‘constitutional identity’ is stated to be different from the ‘national identity’ referred to in Article 4(2) TEU.’

 

 

(2)    The legality of the OMT scheme

 

The German court’s concerns regarding the legality of the OMT programme can be summarized as follows: first, the programme is a measure of economic, not monetary policy, and as such beyond the remit of the ECB. Second, a programme of this kind amounts to monetary financing of a Member State, which Art 123 TFEU prohibits. It would allow the ECB to become lender of last resort to a country in financial difficulties, and it would transform EMU into a transfer union—something not foreseen in the current Treaties.

 

Is it monetary policy?

 

The AG started by considering the nature of the OMT scheme as a measure of monetary or economic policy. The applicants had argued that the scheme should be classified as an economic policy measure with the aim of saving the euro by changing certain flaws in the design of monetary union, i.e. by pooling the debt of euro countries. They also emphasized the effects of the attached conditionality on Member States’ economic policies. All this, they argued, placed the OMT scheme beyond the merely supporting role that the ECB may have in economic policy, according to the Treaties. The German Constitutional Court agreed, based on various features of the OMT scheme: its conditionality and parallelism with ESM and EFSF financial assistance programmes (as well as its ability to circumvent them) and its selectivity (in that OMT bond-buying would only apply to select countries, whereas measures of monetary policy typically apply to the whole currency area).

 

The ECB, on the other hand, argued that the aim of the scheme ‘is not to facilitate the financing conditions of certain Member States, or to determine their economic policies, but rather to ‘unblock’ the ECB’s monetary policy transmission channels’ [104]. In other words, the crisis was making it impossible for the ECB to pursue monetary policy through the usual channels. The proposed bond-buying would ensure that credit conditions return to normality, and that the ECB is able to conduct its monetary policy again. Additionally, the ECB argued that the element of conditionality was necessary to ensure that the OMT scheme would not interfere with the programme of macroeconomic reform agreed between the ESM and the Member State in receipt of financial assistance.

 

The AG started by considering that it is within the ECB’s considerable discretion to adopt ‘non-conventional’ measures of monetary policy in exceptional circumstances. He accepted that it was the ECB’s intention to pursue monetary policy when announcing the OMT scheme and then proceeded to analyse whether the features of the OMT programme bore out this initial aim. After addressing each of the German court’s arguments, it came to the conclusion that the OMT scheme was indeed a measure of monetary policy—with one caveat: the AG saw a problem in the fact that the ECB made bond-buying through the OMT scheme conditional on the Member State’s compliance with a programme of macroeconomic reform adopted within the framework of the ESM or EFSF, and the fact that the ECB plays a very active role in the negotiating and monitoring of this programme with the Member State. This double role of the ECB (first within a framework for financial assistance which constitutes economic policy, according to Pringle, and then in its bond-buying role within the OMT) would tip the OMT scheme beyond the boundaries of the ECB’s powers: monetary policy with, at most, a supporting role in economic policy. The AG thus considered that, if the OMT were to be activated, the ECB would have to distance itself from the Troika and the monitoring of the conditionality for financial assistance immediately.

 

Is it proportionate?

 

Once the AG was generally satisfied as to the monetary nature of the OMT scheme, he reviewed its proportionality; the fact that this was a non-conventional use of competence made the proportionality assessment the more essential.

 

The OMT programme is an incomplete measure (as not all its features were specified in the ECB press release, and the programme has never been implemented). The AG considered that the programme’s basic features were known and could be put through an initial proportionality assessment, but that a full review of proportionality will only be possible once or if the OMT programme is ever fully regulated. The result of that initial proportionality assessment was positive: the basic configuration of the OMT programme passed the tests of suitability, necessity (the AG considered that the limitations suggested by the referring court would likely render the programme ineffective) and proportionality stricto sensu. The broad discretion granted to the ECB had a bearing on the application of the proportionality test. In sum, the programme was considered proportionate in principle, subject to the ECB complying with the requirements of proportionality (among them the duty to give reasons) if the programme is ever implemented.

 

Is it against the prohibition on monetary financing?

 

Once the nature of the OMT programme had been discussed, the Opinion turned to the possible circumvention of the prohibition on monetary financing of Member States, which is a further manifestation of one of the principles underlying EMU, namely fiscal discipline. While the Treaty makes it illegal for the ECB to buy government bonds directly from a Member State, the referring court argued that, although OMT bond-buying would take place in the secondary market, this amounted to a circumvention of the same rule. This circumvention would undermine fiscal discipline and would make certain Member States responsible, ultimately, for the debts of others, which is banned by Article 125 TFEU.

 

The AG considered that the prohibition of monetary financing (as a manifestation of fiscal discipline) was one of the features of the constitutional framework of EMU that contributes to the attainment of a higher objective, the financial stability of the monetary union (Pringle). Exceptions to this prohibition must thus be interpreted restrictively, and a formalistic approach must be avoided: the focus must be on the substance of the measure, and not on whether the bond-buying occurs directly or in the secondary market.

 

The referring court had identified various technical features of the OMT scheme as running counter to this prohibition: the ECB’s lack of preferential creditor status and waiver of rights, its exposure to excessive risk, the disruptive effects of holding the bonds until maturity, the fact that bond-buying in the secondary market would take place on a large scale and only a short time after their issue (making it too similar in its effects to buying bonds directly from the state) and that the ECB’s action would encourage new investors to buy newly issued bonds. In very broad terms, the German court’s view was that these features amounted to a circumvention of the prohibition of monetary financing because, even though the bond-buying would take place in the secondary market, it would disrupt the market and undermine fiscal discipline to an intolerable degree.

 

The AG disagreed on all counts but one; after discussing the effects of each technical feature, he considered that they were not disruptive enough of the normal functioning of the market and of fiscal discipline to fall foul of the Treaty. Again, with one caveat: if the ECB ever implements the programme, the timing needs to allow for actual formation of a market price in respect of government bonds before the ECB buys them. If the ECB does that, according to the AG, the technical features of the OMT programme do not endanger fiscal discipline to a disproportionate degree, and as such they do not have the potential to make Member States responsible for each other’s debts or turn EMU into a transfer union.

 

 

Final Remarks

 

The AG Opinion in Gauweiler is thoughtful and carefully argued. His discussion of the German court’s case-law and the problematic of the reference is measured, while still seeking to protect certain elements of the Court’s jurisdiction that he considers essential to the integrity of the EU legal system. It will be interesting to see how the Court of Justice handles the matter in its decision but, just as importantly, how the German Constitutional Court reacts to the latter.

 

The Opinion is less diplomatic when it comes to the legality of the OMT scheme: it rejects almost all concerns put forward by the referring court, and it does so from a particular conception of the independence of the ECB and the role of courts in controlling its activities. In this regard, the Opinion can be said to continue in the Pringle vein of ratifying the move from a rules-based EMU to a policy-based one in the wake of the crisis. Yet despite the wide margin of discretion enjoyed by the ECB, the Court has a crucial role to play in protecting the constitutional framework of EMU and of the Union. In his Opinion, the AG discharges this task by grounding an important part of the analysis on the technical features of the OMT and their effects: this is particularly clear when it comes to the question of whether the programme is compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing, where the discussion turns on technical matters rather than on more abstract ones such as the nature of EMU, its evolution, and the role of solidarity within its constitutional framework. While this may seem like a shame, it is also understandable: this broader debate is of paramount importance, but the Court (or any court) may not be the most suitable forum for it.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 19

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Beyond austerity: the future of EU employment law

Professor Catherine Barnard, Trinity College Cambridge

If the critics are right, the EU social model is dead. Those on the right may well be dancing on its grave; those more sympathetic might mourn its passing. My view is more sanguine. Yes, the European social model (ESM) is certainly facing unprecedented challenges. However, I will suggest that these challenges, caused in part by the EU’s response to the crisis but more generally resulting from a growing hostility towards the European Union project as a whole, are not terminal and that there is – and should be - a continued role for the European social model. The EU’s history demonstrates that the ESM has, in fact, a long-standing ability to regenerate and resurrect itself. In this blog post, I would like to consider the future.

Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke argue that ‘Europe needs a Social Union that can support national welfare states on a systemic level in key functions such as macroeconomic stabilisation, and also guide the development of national welfare states on the basis of general social standards and objectives.’ [1] For the eurozone states this may indeed be the best and necessary solution. However, I want to focus on an agenda which might hold some appeal to an EU of 28, or at least a combination of both Eurozone and non-Eurozone states and this inevitably focuses on the narrower domain of employment law. And my discussion is tempered by political reality. 

Social compact

First, I would call for the creation of a European Social Compact to match the Fiscal Compact. This would contain a strong statement of the value and importance of social policy in the EU and would help to address the long-standing concern that, come the crunch, the EU prioritises economic over social interests. This would send a stronger message to the legislature and to the courts of the role and function of social policy, a message that the phrase ‘social market economy’ has failed to send with significant force. So what might go in it?

Apart from general statements that the EU is about improving the living and working conditions of its population, I would like to see express reference being made to other social rights documents, including the European Social Charter of 1961, to create a greater opening of the EU to other international instruments. I would also suggest the need for a clause which explicitly requires the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines to take account of social matters. More radically, I would also like to see the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB) to be extended, like that of the Federal Reserve in the US and other central banks, to promoting economic growth, as well as high levels of employment and social cohesion, and not just the maintenance of price stability, as specified in Article 127 TFEU.

Ideally any Social Compact would apply to all 28 states and take the form of a Treaty amendment. However, the current political climate makes this seem unlikely (the UK would certainly vote against, as might a number of other Member States worried about the implications of a Treaty amendment on their own national systems). This inevitably means looking at some sort of free standing Treaty, like the Fiscal Compact, which could be signed up to by interested Member States and have force under international law. Another model for flexibility would be to follow the pattern of the Euro Plus Pact, agreed by interested Member States. It is not legally binding but it is taken into account in the various soft-law processes rather in the way of the Stability and Growth Pact Resolution of 1997. 

Medium-term measures

I fully accept that a Social Compact is a long shot and that any reform protocol, while important, is not exciting. So what else could the EU be doing? I would suggest the EU go back to its roots and, as it did in the 1970s, specialise. There are three areas which could be singled out as needing the EU’s attention, where EU level activity might be justified given the transnational dimension, and where action has a direct connection with the European Semester: ageing population, enforcement, and addressing the consequences of privatisation.

The justification for EU involvement with management of an ageing population relates to the key issue of sustainability of public finances which, as the Eurozone crisis has shown, is a matter of common interest. The EU has long had expertise in the discrimination area, starting with sex and then in respect of other protected characteristics. Addressing age discrimination/extending working life initiatives/flexible working fits in with this specialisation while dovetailing with the EU’s social cohesion agenda. On a related issue, developing family friendly policies - which would include elder care as well as child care – would also fit within this theme. The reform of the Parental Leave Directive serves only to highlight other lacuna in EU provision such as the absence of provisions on the right to request reduced hours of working. There may be room for EU intervention here.

Second, there is a growing body of evidence that migrant workers are being mistreated by some employers in certain sectors, particularly meat processing. If these workers cannot, for practical reasons, enforce their rights, there is a role for the EU to consider intervening to require effective remedies. The new Directive 2014/54 on free movement of workers is a step in the right direction. But there is evidence that migrant workers do not enforce their rights through tribunals. This requires more pro-active enforcement. Is there a role for greater coordination at EU level of, for example, labour inspectors? Or even, more radically, some sort of Europol for labour inspections?

If the EU was to devote its attention to the position of (vulnerable) migrant workers, other issues arise for these workers (as well as for nationals). In particular, what sort of contracts do they have? In recent years there has been a proliferation of new types of contracting, including zero hours contracts, internships, crowd employment and employee sharing. To what extent do individuals engaged in this kind of work benefit from employment protection legislation traditionally given only to those defined as ‘employees’? Should the EU envisage legislating for a new type of contract such as Freedland’s contract to provide personal service which would provide a gateway to employment protection?

Third, privatisation of publicly owned industries and services is clearly an important part of the reform agenda for a number of Member States. What are the employment law implications of this? Does the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/23 need revision to provide meaningful rights to transferees in the event of the transfer and for a significant period thereafter? How does the Directive fit into the public procurement process? Is it time for the transfer rules to be re-examined in the light of the new contexts in which they are being invoked? 

Legal basis to act

I have given some examples of what the EU might do to boost the social dimension. The question is how the EU might deliver them. The EU has significant legal competence to act in these fields – whether under Article 153 TFEU (the principal social policy legal basis), Article 21(2) or Article 25 TFEU (the citizenship provisions), Article 26(3) TFEU (on guidelines and conditions necessary for ensuring balanced progress in all sectors of the internal market), Article 46 TFEU (the legal basis on which Directive 2014/54 on measures facilitating the exercise of free movement of workers was adopted), Article 50(1) TFEU on freedom of establishment (the legal basis on which the directive on diversity information is proposed), the internal market legal bases, Articles 114 and 115 TFEU but, following the Monti II debacle, probably not Article 352 TFEU.

The use of any of these legal bases have (de)merits but what is even more important is the political will to act and that seems to be lacking in a number of Member States. So this raises the question of whether enhanced cooperation should be considered in the social policy field ‘to enable and encourage a group of Member States to cooperate inside rather than outside the Union, where it is established that the objectives pursued by that cooperation cannot be achieved by the Union as a whole’ (see the Unitary Patent case).The use of enhanced cooperation is strictly limited by the framework for enhanced cooperation between Member States found in Title IV of the TEU and Title III (Article 20 TEU) of Part Six of the TFEU (Articles 326 to 334 TFEU).  Provided these conditions are satisfied, there seems no good reason why enhanced cooperation cannot be used in the social field. It is far from optimal – but better than nothing. The Unitary Patent case may suggest, too, that it has the Court’s blessing.

Despite the doomsayers, the EU is still intact after the most tumultuous years of its existence. The European Social Model, too, has been battered by the crisis, but it was already in difficulties before that. Reforms were necessary. In the last five years, economic governance and its reform has predominated, often at the expense of the development of the social dimension. The European Employment Strategy has been accommodated – and largely subsumed by - the European semester. This loss of a separate and distinct identity of the EES has been damaging. (Part of) the EU is conscious of this and it maybe that the new European Parliament and the new Commission will recognise the need to raise the profile of social policy. The EU’s regenerative capacity in the field of social policy needs to be shown again. And there are lots of ideas as to what the EU might do.

A full version of these comments has appeared in (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 1


Barnard & Peers: chapter 20 

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[1]Frank Vandenbroucke and Bart Vanhercke note, European Social Union: Ten Tough Nuts to Crack (Friends of Europe, 2014), 16. See also Commissioner Andor, ‘Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union: what lessons to draw from the European Elections’, 13 June 2014 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-455_en.htm.

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Clash of the Judicial Titans: Will the Euro survive?

Steve Peers

The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) has finally sent a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Moreover, it has chosen a crucially important issue to ask questions about. This issue is the validity of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) – the very policy which is credited with keeping the EU’s single currency alive, perhaps single-handedly. If either of these courts rules that this policy is invalid, the very existence of the EU’s single currency could be called into question.

 In a nutshell, the OMT constitutes a promise made by the ECB, back in the summer of 2012, that it would if necessary purchase the government bonds of troubled eurozone Member States on the secondary market (ie, from banks and other financial institutions which own those bonds). The purpose of the policy was to shore up confidence as regards the specific economies in question, and therefore in the single currency in general. In return, among other things, the countries concerned would have to sign up to austerity programmes. While the OMT has never actually been triggered, the mere possibility of its use appears to have calmed financial markets’ doubts about the survival of the single currency (and about the continued use of the euro by all the EU Member States which currently use it) considerably. The BVerfG’s decision to send any question to the CJEU is itself historic. It comes soon after the first references to the Court of Justice from the Spanish Constitutional Court (Melloni) and the French Constitutional Court (Case C-168/13 F, which concerned Jeremy Forrest, the British schoolteacher who ran off with one of his pupils). So all the big beasts among Europe’s constitutional courts have now engaged with the CJEU.

 However, it is clear that the BVerfG at least still does not really regard the CJEU as the king of the jungle. It asserts its intention to find that the OMT programme breaches the German constitution, depending on what the CJEU has to say. On the other hand, the CJEU has always asserted that it is the sole judge of whether an EU act is valid (going back to the judgment in Foto-Frost). Can the single currency survive this conflict between constitutional principles?

The legal issues 

The BVerfG (along with many others, particularly in Germany) doubts that the OMT programme is legal, because it constitutes economic policy (rather than monetary policy) and because it amounts to the ECB buying up eurozone governments’ debt, which is not permitted under the Treaties which the EU is founded up.

Let’s have a closer look at these arguments. First of all, is the OMT programme an economic policy? While the EU has established an economic and monetary union (EMU) among eurozone Member States, and economic and monetary policies are obviously closely related, there is nonetheless a sharp legal difference between the two policies as a matter of EU law. Monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the EU, as far as the eurozone Member States are concerned. Within the EU, the ECB is in charge of that policy.

On the other hand, economic policy is primarily a matter for Member States; the Union (primarily the Council) only coordinates such policies.While this division may not make much economic sense, any significant shift of powers over economic policy to the EU would have been impossible to agree politically, and have raised great(er) doubts about the EU’s legitimacy.

In its Pringle judgment of 2012, the CJEU ruled that the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which establishes a system for eurozone Member States to lend financial support to each other, was an act of economic policy, not monetary policy. But the CJEU did not define what ‘monetary policy’ consisted of.

The BVerfG doubts that the OMT programme is valid because it constitutes an independent economic policy of the ECB. But as the BVerfG itself notes, the Treaties provide (in Art. 127(1) TFEU) that the European System of Central Banks (which the ECB forms a key part of) ‘shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union’ set out in Art. 3 TEU. Arguably the OMT programme is exactly that: support for the economic policies of Member States (including the ESM) as regards the EU’s objective of establishing and maintaining a single currency. As long as the economic conditionality linked to the OMT programme is no different from, or at least consistent with, the economic conditionality linked to the ESM and the EU rules on economic governance (ie, control of excessive deficits), then the OMT programme cannot be said to constitute a separate economic policy of the ECB.

Secondly, does the OMT programme circumvent the ban on buying government debt? Article 123 TFEU specifies that the ECB and national central banks cannot ‘purchase directly’ the ‘debt instruments’ of eurozone Member States’ governments. Obviously, the word ‘directly’ is significant; if the authors of the Treaties had wanted to ban the ECB from ever owning a government bond issued by a eurozone Member State, they would have left that word out. So it can hardly be doubted that the ECB can purchase such bonds from financial institutions, at least on a modest and non-systematic basis. 

But the BVerfG is concerned about the underlying purpose of the ban on direct purchases of government bonds: to prevent governments from being ‘propped up’ by the central bank. If all government bonds issued by Eurozone Member States were systematically snapped up by the ECB from the financial institutions which had initially bought them, the ECB would arguably be circumventing the ban on direct purchases.

The best approach to this objection is to interpret the ECB’s powers in light of its obligation to contribute to achieving the EU’s objectives, in particular the development of the single currency. In the ordinary course of events, purchasing significant numbers of eurozone government bonds directly on the secondary market might not have a strong link to the existence of the single currency. But in the current circumstances, it does. So this justifies a flexible approach to the limits which might otherwise apply to the ECB’s actions – provided that such purchases are on secondary markets, and are necessary to ensure the single currency’s survival.

The judicial politics 

The BVerfG states clearly what it expects the CJEU to do: to interpret the OMT programme in accordance with its specified constraints, otherwise it will rule that the programme is in breach of the German constitution. But the BVerfG has warned the CJEU before, and then not gone through with its threats. It has come to resemble an angry parent issuing increasingly dire threats to a naughty child – and then not following through on them. The naughty child soon realises that the threats won’t be carried out, and adapts her (mis)behaviour accordingly. 

And there is another factor at play here. When the BVerfG was asked if Germany could ratify (for instance) the Lisbon Treaty, there was a clear route to ensure that its judgment was carried out. Very simply, it could have ordered the German government not to ratify that Treaty. Similarly, in cases concerning the EU’s banana market legislation, or the interpretation of EU age discrimination rules, it could have ordered the German administration and courts not to apply the rules concerned. But it is less clear exactly what it can do to stop the actions of the ECB, which presumably would not consider itself bound by a BVerfG decision. The BVerfG refers to requiring the German government to act (unless there is a retroactive amendment of the German constitution), but exactly how that will stop the application of the OMT programme is unclear. So our naughty child in Luxembourg – and her naughty brother in Frankfurt – must know that their ostensibly strict parent probably can’t carry out this particular threat.

In that case, how will they behave? It might be expected that many of the concerns raised by the BVerfG can be addressed, but not all. In particular, it is hard to see how the OMT programme could achieve its objectives if the ECB does not have the power to buy significant number of government bonds on secondary markets. Possibly the CJEU will allow such purchases to continue, subject to certain conditions – which the BVerfG may decide are strict enough to meet its concerns. Judging from the overall tone of the latter court’s ruling, it is looking to find a way to uphold the validity of the OMT programme despite its fundamental objections.


Barnard & Peers: chapter 19

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