A.T. v Luxembourg: the start of the EU-ECHR story on criminal defence rights

Alex Tinsley,  Legal & Policy Officer (Head of EU Office) at Fair Trials, based in Brussels. Twitter: @AlexLouisT

On 9 April 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) gave judgment in A.T. v Luxembourg. The judgment, which will become final unless referred to the Grand Chamber, in finding a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), develops the principles established in the Salduz v Turkey. At the invitation of Fair Trials International, third party intervener, it also takes into account, for the first time, Directive 2013/48/EU on access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings (the ‘Access to a Lawyer Directive’), a possible indicator of future convergence in this area.

Background

The applicant, A.T. was questioned by police following surrender under a European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) (as to the cross-border aspect, see the post-script). On arrival, he demanded a lawyer. Police gave information (it is unclear what) which led him to accept to be questioned without one. He denied the offences. He was then questioned again before the investigating judge, with a lawyer present but (a) without having had the chance to talk with that lawyer beforehand and (b) without the lawyer having had sight of the case file prior to that questioning; again, he denied the offences.

A.T. argued that his defence rights had been breached as he had been denied access to a lawyer. The appeal court, and then the Court of Cassation, rejected this, essentially finding that he had agreed to be questioned without a lawyer and that no obligation arose to remedy any prejudice caused. With local remedies exhausted, A.T. applied to the ECtHR arguing a violation of Article 6 ECHR.

The legal territory: the Salduzprinciple

The case was decided by reference to the ECtHR’s 2008 judgment in Salduz v Turkey, which established that a person charged with a criminal offence has a right of access to a lawyer ‘as from the first interrogation by police’, and that the rights of the defence are irretrievably prejudiced if incriminating statements made in the absence of a lawyer are used for a conviction (para 55). There are, however, some unanswered questions about this principle, some of which are resolved here.

EU law in the mix

Salduz caused waves of litigation and reform in Europe, including in older EU Member States like the UK and France. Yet, significant problems remain in practice. This is the ECtHR’s summary of Fair Trials’ view on this in A.T. v Luxembourg: ‘many suspects encounter serious difficulties in the exercise of this right, in particular due to legal or practical restrictions on the right of access to a lawyer, a prevalence of supposed ‘waivers’ of the right whose reliability is questionable, and ineffective remedial action by the courts to repair violations’ (at 59).

With Member States required to cooperate on the basis of mutual trust, such concerns are problematic. So, in 2009, the EU adopted a ‘Roadmap’, a ste-by-step plan to adopt directives on key defence rights under the new legal basis of Article 82(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, in order to strengthen mutual trust. After Directive2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation & translation and Directive2012/13/EU on the right to information, came the Access to a Lawyer Directive(together, the ‘Roadmap Directives’), setting minimum standards on access to a lawyer.

These Directives mostly attempt to ‘codify’ ECtHR jurisprudence, but in doing so create new standards and – as for the issue at stake here – in some places may anticipate the case-law. This is significant. As Fair Trials argued in this case, the ECtHR can and does have regard to such measures when developing its case-law, so the presence of the Roadmap Directives raises significant possibility of cross-fertilisation between EU law and the ECHR. A.T. appears to be a first example of this.

The A.T. v Luxembourg judgment

You cannot waive a right that you do not have

The judgment clarifies that since there was in fact no legal right to a lawyer at the initial questioning – this was the case at the time in Luxembourg for the narrow category of persons questioned following surrender under a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) – the purported ‘waiver’ of that right was inoperative (at 71): you cannot waive an entitlement which the law does not confer upon you.

If access to a lawyer is denied, a remedy may be needed even in absence of a confession

That being established, the ECtHR found that the courts had infringed Article 6 ECHR by relying on the statements A.T. made in that context and not taking any remedial action to repair the prejudice caused by the restriction on A.T.’s right to a lawyer (at 72), e.g. excluding his statements (see 73).

It is worth noting, in that regard, that Luxembourg had argued that no violation of Article 6 arose because A.T. had denied the offences (see 55). The logic is that if you don’t confess, the absence of a lawyer does not make any difference. Fair Trials had argued for a more protective line (see 61). Relying on the Article 12 of the Access to a Lawyer Directive, which refers to ‘statements’, not simply confessions, we noted that a person might compromise themselves in other ways, e.g. saying too much or too little, speaking confusedly under pressure, damaging their credibility vis-à-vis other witnesses etc. (see the actual intervention, paragraph 41). The ECtHR followed this line, pointing out that A.T. had ‘changed his story’ during the proceedings and that his early statements, though denials of the allegations, were held against him in that way (at 72). This is a useful addition to a line of cases which had so far only dealt with mostly with total silence, flat denials or clear confessions.

Access to a lawyer includes a right to prior consultation before questioning

The judgment is, though perhaps most notable for its emphasis on the importance of a consultation between lawyer and client prior to questioning (at 86). This is a new development of the case-law, complementing Navone v. Monaco and other cases (79) establishing that there be should assistance during questioning. The legal assistance provided to A.T. during the questioning, without such a prior opportunity, was not ‘effective’ and so did not meet the requirements of Article 6 ECHR (at 89).

Roadmap aficionados will note that in so finding, the ECtHR took account of Article 3(3)(a) of the Access to a Lawyer Directive which articulates this requirement in black and white. This is the first time one of the Roadmap Directives has been referred to in the interpretation of the ECHR, and it raises questions as to possible convergence and how the ECtHR is going to react to rulings from the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) on the Roadmap Directives (see comments below).

Access to the case file prior to questioning?

On one point, however, the ECtHR will have disappointed some people. Lawyers in Spain, France and Luxembourg in particular have been arguing for some time that legal assistance is not effective if the lawyer does not have access to the case file prior to questioning, in order to advise the client on an informed basis (more here). The A.T. case gave the ECtHR a chance to say whether such a right arose under the ECHR, and it – or this Chamber, at least – has taken a negative view.

What remains now on this point is Article 7(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU, requiring access to documents which are essential for challenging detention. The Paris bar reckons this is a key to the police case file prior to questioning (see their pleading). The conservative view, which seems closer to the text of the provision, sees this as relevant only to judicial review of detention, and it appears the ECtHR shares the view (see 80). But bearing in mind that (as in Luxembourg) the questioning may be done by a judge who also makes a first decision on detention, the broader view is credible. It seems likely that there will be further instalments in this particular discussion.

Disposal: ensure a fair (re)trial next time

Disinformation about human rights abounds, so it is worth reminding oneself what such an ECtHR judgment actually entails. A.T., accused of serious offences, does not now walk free. The ECtHR did not order his release (it cannot), or award damages. The Chamber, under ECtHR President Dean Spielmann, simply indicated that Luxembourg should give him a retrial compliant with Article 6 ECHR (97). Prosecutors had other evidence, besides the statements made without a lawyer, with which to prosecute, so their case is not lost. The retrial should simply be fair, in line with ECHR and EU norms.

Comments

Interaction between EU law and ECHR has looked unappealing of late. Not long ago, in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, found for the second time that execution of the EU’s ‘Dublin’ system for return of asylum-seekers to other Member States would infringe human rights protected by the ECHR. The CJEU, apparently miffed, then issued its alarming comments in Opinion 2/13, stating that, in obliging Member States to question each other’s compliance with human rights despite EU law obligations of mutual trust, the EU’s proposed accession to the ECHR would interfere with the EU legal order.

For 50 years, the CJEU has dealt with individuals invoking Treaty rights in order to defeat protectionist trade rules, enhance free movement and bring countries closer together in ever closer union. Now all of a sudden the countries are trying to cooperate in justice and home affairs, the individual is invoking rights to resist this, and the CJEU appears concerned. If one adopts this rationale, the issue can be confined to the cross-border sphere.

In the internal context, where cooperation interests are not at issue, a more progressive trajectory can be envisaged. When the CJEU’s Elgafaji judgment recognised that Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive was intended to provide an additional layer of protection against refoulementfor those escaping situations of indiscriminate violence, the ECtHR quickly responded in Sufi and Elmi v. UK that it was ‘not persuaded’ the standard under Article 3 ECHR was any lower, going a step further than it had in earlier cases. One can discern an element of upward competition here.

What will happen with the Roadmap Directives remains to be seen. The point decided in A.T. v Luxembourg – that one should have a chance to talk with one’s lawyer before being questioned – appears uncontroversial and would have been adopted anyway by the ECtHR. But nevertheless, it offers an example of EU law setting a standard, which the ECtHR then finds exists in the ECtHR too. It will, in that light, be interesting to see how the CJEU will treat new questions without obvious answers in the existing-case-law of the ECtHR, and what the reaction will be from Strasbroug.

The first case on the Roadmap Directives (Case C-216/14 Covaci) is pending, and the comments in the Advocate General Bot Opinion of 7 May 2015 are interesting from that perspective: these ‘minimal rules’ should be seen as ‘irreducable’ fundamentals (32); they should be approached expansively, as strengthening defence rights will strengthen judicial cooperation (33); and, while the Roadmap Direcives respect national legal cultures, national procedures will have to ensure their useful effect or face striking down by the national courts, with the CJEU on standby to give preliminary rulings (34). His conclusions on the specific case require a separate blog post, but this proposed interpretative logic is notable: it suggests, as we notedlast year, that the counterpart to CJEU’s robust defence of mutual trust could be a robust approach to the Roadmap Directives designed to strengthen that trust. If the CJEU’s rulings are expansive, the ECtHR might then be slow to aim any lower, with consequent impact outside the EU. But here one goes further into the realm of speculation.

Of course, for anything to happen, lawyers need to put the issues before the courts. Working with the Legal Experts Advisory Panel (‘LEAP’), our pan-EU criminal law network, we offer free legal training, designed to share ideas across jurisdictions and encourage innovative litigation. The ECtHR listened to LEAP in A.T., and we can help in national cases too (see our comparative law opinions in cases before the Swedish Supreme Court (here) and Belgian Court of Cassation (here)). The idea is to participate in the developing EU-ECHR story and use it as an opportunity to improve defence rights across Europe. If you would like to get involved, contact Fair Trials’ Legal & Policy team.

Another version of this post appeared on the Fair Trials website.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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EU Zombie Law: the CJEU re-animates the old 'third pillar'

 

Steve Peers

Back in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the EU began adopting measures on criminal law and policing under a peculiar institutional system, known in practice as the ‘third pillar’ of EU law. This system was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, and then survived several attempts to kill it over the next decade; indeed I once compared it to Rasputin. The Treaty of Lisbon nominally finished it off it as from that Treaty’s entry into force (1 December 2009); but this was subject to a five-year transitional period.

That makes it sound as though the third pillar finally came to an end on 1 December 2014 – but it did not. Indeed two judgments of the CJEU yesterday (here and here) not only maintain old third pillar measures in force, but allow new measures based on them to be adopted. Third pillar measures aren’t exactly dead yet – rather they are undead. Let’s take a look at these zombies of EU law.

Background

The Treaty of Lisbon has a transitional Protocol, which contains two rules relating to the third pillar. First of all, Article 10 sets out the five-year transitional period, after which the normal jurisdiction of the CJEU would apply to the measures concerned. At the same time, the UK could choose to opt out of all of these measures, and then opt back in to some of them, as it indeed did last year (see discussion here).

Secondly, Article 9 of that Protocol, which is not subject to a time limit, states that third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon stay in force until they are amended or repealed. Some of them have been amended or repealed, or will be soon (the law establishing Europol, for instance). But the majority remain in force, including the controversial law establishing the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).

Why does this still matter? First of all, the pre-Lisbon measures don’t confer direct effect on individuals, so can’t be invoked to create rights in national courts. Secondly, this means that the European Parliament (EP) has not had any real say in the adoption of these measures. In particular, the EP has a lot of excellent suggestions for the reform of the EAW. Thirdly, a legal question arises as to whether the pre-Lisbon measures can serve as a legal basis for the adoption of new measures even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This question was answered by yesterday’s judgments.

Judgments

The EP challenged the validity of post-Lisbon Council measures which had implemented pre-Lisbon EU criminal law acts, in particular giving police forces access to the EU’s Visa Information System and prohibiting some new designer drugs. There are parallel actions still pending, against measures implementing pre-Lisbon laws establishing Europol and the ‘Prum’ system of exchanging data between national police forces.

The reason for the EP’s objection to these measures was that the Council exercises these powers by means of a qualified majority vote, and argues that it does not have to consult the EP at all, since the legal requirement to consult the EP was set out in the old third pillar rules in the Treaty, which were repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon. In the EP’s view, the Council should use the post-Lisbon rules for the adoption of implementing measures, ie giving the Commission the power to adopt delegated acts over which the EP has control. Alternatively, fresh EU legislative acts have to be adopted; these would be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure.

The CJEU ruled that, in accordance with Article 9 of the transitional protocol, the pre-Lisbon measures remain in force. In the Court’s view, that also means that the Council is entitled to adopt implementing measures following the pre-Lisbon process. However, the Court, unlike the Advocate-General, said that the Council at least has to consult the European Parliament on these measures. It reasoned in effect that the cross-reference to the repealed Treaty rules in the pre-Lisbon legislation retained those rules in force.

Comments

The Court’s ruling in effect allows the Council to create new third pillar acts long after the third pillar has nominally died. It’s as if zombies could procreate, and give birth to baby zombies (I’m going for a ‘grossest legal analogy’ award here).  Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning as regards the EP’s partial victory means that to some extent, even aspects of the long-dead Treaty rules on the third pillar have now been zombified by the Court.

How much damage could these zombies do? There’s no risk of the famous ‘zombie apocalypse’ affecting EU law. Apart from these implementing measures, all other EU criminal law acts adopted since the Treaty of Lisbon have taken the normal EU form of Directives and Regulations, and have been subject to the post-Lisbon procedures (usually the ordinary legislative procedure). Many pre-Lisbon EU measures (such as the EAW law) don’t provide for implementing measures, and some of those which do (such as the Europol law, as mentioned already) will be replaced soon.

The Court’s rulings are a reasonable legal interpretation of the transitional rules. But the broader political problem remains: many controversial measures affecting civil liberties have had no real input from the EP. Since its resort to the courts has had only limited success, the EP should now consider alternative means (blocking legislation or budget disbursements) to achieve the goals of reviewing pre-Lisbon EU criminal laws – and in particular securing much-needed reforms to the EAW.

 

Photo credit: renewablenow.biz

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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Fundamental Rights and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: an uncomfortable silence

 

 

Michiel Luchtman, Jannemieke Ouwerkerk, Marloes van Noorloos, Pim Geelhoed, Jorrit Rijpma and Louis Middelkoop are members of the Meijers Committee (www.commissie-meijers.nl/en).

The EU’s proposal for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has created quite a stir in the Member States. The EPPO would be competent to investigate and prosecute fraud with EU money (e.g. the misuse of EU funds), although there is already talk about extending its competence to terrorism and other serious crime. So far, political negotiations over the draft regulation have focused on the question why the EU is in in need of this new supranational body in the first place, and on the extent of the EU’s influence on national affairs, particularly in such a sensitive area as criminal justice.

Supposing that in the near future the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will indeed be established, more attention to the substance of the current proposal needs to be paid without delay, particularly to the protection of fundamental rights. The current proposal raises serious concerns on this matter, as it is unclear who will supervise the actions of the EPPO and how this may be done effectively.

Procedural Rights in EU criminal law

In the EU context, the question of who is responsible for the guaranteeing of procedural rights in transnational criminal law enforcement has already frequently been addressed by legislation. After all, Member States of the EU do cooperate intensively on a daily basis: think of the European arrest warrant mechanism, which enables the rapid surrender of suspects from one Member State to another. All such cooperation mechanisms contain provisions on legal protection.

The proposal to establish an EPPO takes criminal justice integration significantly further than any other instrument created thus far. The EPPO will be authorized to take intrusive coercive measures, such as ordering arrests, interceptions of telecommunication, or house searches, just as national prosecutors can. Yet – and unlike national prosecuting authorities – the EPPO would be competent to apply these measures in all the territories of the participating Member States, without the restriction of national borders. It might therefore be expected that the ministers of justice, the European Parliament, and the European Commission would hold extensive debates on the precise conditions for searches, telephone interceptions, arrests, and pre-trial detention in supranational investigations. Surprisingly, they have not.  

On the contrary, in their efforts to prevent a further transfer of power to ‘Brussels’, most Member States oppose any further approximation of criminal procedure. And those who do support the establishment of an EPPO hold that citizens’ rights are already sufficiently protected, referring to the fundamental rights acquis laid down in treaties and the EU Charter. They also point out that the EPPO must respect the additional procedural guarantees provided in the domestic legal order of the Member State where it is conducting its operations.

 From national to transnational criminal procedure

Such safeguards are designed for the administration of criminal justice in a domestic system and will not always fit the new transnational setting of the EPPO. The potential consequences of this systemic flaw in EPPO’s design are highly problematic. Imagine that the EPPO conducts a house search without proper judicial authorization in Amsterdam, and then that the case is subsequently brought to trial before a Milanese criminal court. Should the Italian judge apply the complicated Dutch case-law on unlawful house searches? And should the EPPO be allowed to search someone’s personal computer online, from a distance, in order to evade the stricter rules of the Member State on whose territory the computer is located? After all, it is not only the mobility of criminals that is increasing, but also of witnesses, information, and evidence in the area of freedom, security and justice to which the EU aspires. Nonetheless, the proposal remains silent on these issues, with such potential consequence as forum shopping and a race to the bottom of the lowest level of safeguards.

The envisaged framework for the EPPO leaves an important question unanswered: Do discretionary margins for choosing the applicable national law with respect to investigatory powers, procedural safeguards, judicial supervision, admissibility of evidence, etceterapermit arbitrary interference with the fundamental rights of citizens involved in criminal proceedings?

Both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice have consistently stressed the importance of the rule of law, as a vital mechanism defending against arbitrary interference with citizens’ fundamental rights. The law provides citizens with legal certainty as to the scope of their rights and duties; it helps to effectuate their defence rights; and it enables courts to prevent executive discretion from turning into arbitrariness. Under the proposed EPPO set-up, the problem is not that national laws are absent, unclear or ignored. The problem is rather that the EPPO is given more than twenty divergent national legal system to work with. This creates the risk that a legal avenue for a particular intrusive measure might be very easy to obtain. In certain cases, the EPPO is allowed to choose the most attractive rules from multiple codes of criminal procedure – and continuously to change the rules during the game, without its adversaries having any say on the matter, and without courts being able to exercise control. This leaves citizens without an adequate indication of which set of national rules will apply in a particular case. 

As a community based on the rule of law, the European Union should protect its citizens against arbitrary action by European law enforcement authorities. In order to guarantee that the rule of law will be upheld in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, citizens must be offered legal certainty  as to which law will be applied. Moreover, the law must be adequately accessible to all citizens: they must be permitted to know their rights and duties, and invoke them in court.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 9, chapter 25

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Is the EU coming to save legal aid, or to bury it? An assessment of negotiations on the proposed Directive

 

by Claire Perinaud (FREE Group Trainee)

For many people facing criminal charges, legal aid is essential if they wish to defend themselves effectively. The EU is planning to adopt legislation on this issue in the near future. But will it actually make a significant contribution to ensuring suspects’ rights in this area?

State of implementation of the Procedural rights roadmap.

After years of unsuccessful attempts, starting in 2004 with a general Commission proposal on procedural rights, it was only from the end of 2009 that the EU legislation on procedural rights for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings has progressively taken shape. This was due to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU art. 82(2) now confer the power to adopt legislation on this issue), to article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (providing for the right to a fair trial) and to a political “roadmap” by which, in November 2009 the Council relaunched the Commission original proposals following a step-by-step approach instead of trying to adopt comprehensive legislation as initially foreseen in 2004.

However it is more than likely that this pragmatic approach and the transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting of the EU Member States in the Council (as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon) has made possible the adoption in co-decision with the European Parliament of the three first legislative measures on suspects’ rights: Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings; Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings; and Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings.

Building on this success, at the end of November 2013 the Commission proposed a second “package” of suspects’ rights measures, comprising: a directive on procedural safeguards for children who are suspected or accused in criminal proceedings; a recommendation on procedural safeguards for vulnerable people suspected or accused in criminal proceedings; a directive strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings; a directive on the right to provisional legal aid for citizens suspected or accused of a crime; and a recommendation on the right to legal aid for suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings.

In 2014 the Council already reached a general approach on the proposal for a directive on procedural safeguards for children and on the directive on the presumption of innocence. On this basis the dialogue between the Council and the European Parliament (EP) is about to start and it is possible that in the coming months an agreement could be reached so that these texts could be adopted already at the EP’s “first reading”.

Last week the Council reached (after eight months of internal negotiations!) a general approach also on the draft Directive on provisional legal aid for persons deprived of liberty in criminal proceedings and will start in the coming weeks the dialogue with the Parliament also on this text.  

The coming months will then be extremely important for EU procedural rights in criminal matters even if it will not be easy to achieve the high results that the European Parliament and some Member States were expecting. In the absence of the energetic push of the former Commission Vice President Reding there is a risk that the negotiations may achieve the lowest common denominator between the Member States also due to the unwillingness of some of them to adopt any EU legislation which can create further financial and internal institutional tensions.

Legal aid : why make it simple when you can make it tricky ?

The draft Directive on legal aid is probably the text which is currently facing the most adverse winds. Already the initial Commission’s political choice not to deal with legal aid in the Directive on the access to lawyer has created an artificial disconnection from the right to legal aid and the more general “right to legal advice”which is required by the ECHR jurisprudence as well as by the EU Charter (Articles 47 and 48). (On the human rights aspects of the right to legal aid, see the annex).

Instead of tabling a proposal that would cover these two interconnected rights, the Commission chose to come forward with a proposal on the right to access to a lawyer (now Directive 2013/48/EU) and, separately, with this proposal, which is intended however only as a partial complement to the 2013 Directive. In the words of the Commission, “the … proposal is closely linked to Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer and it aims to contributing to rendering effective the right on access to a lawyer provided for in that Directive at the early stages of the proceedings for suspects or accused persons deprived of liberty”. Thus, no general rules on legal aid, but a mere stop-gap to ensure that in the very early phase of the proceedings some form of legal aid is provided.

Even worse, on the same day that the Commission transmitted its proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council, the Commission adopted a non-binding Recommendation on the right to legal aid for suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings . The aim of this Recommendation is “to foster certain convergence as regards the assessment of eligibility of legal aid in the Member States, as well as encouraging the Member States to take action to improve the quality and effectiveness of legal aid services and administration“.

The legal basis of the Recommendation aside, its understanding of the implementation of the right to legal aid in criminal proceedings is broader than that of the draft Directive.
According to the Recommendation the right of legal aid has to be guaranteed to any suspect or accused person “from the time they are made aware, by official notification or otherwise, by the competent authorities, that they are suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence, and irrespective of whether they are deprived of liberty”, by putting forward the purpose of the right to legal aid, namely to complement and render effective the right of access to a lawyer as set out in Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The work in the Council

The Council started examination of this proposal only in July 2014 under the Italian Presidency. However, no agreement was found and at the December 2014 Justice and Home Affairs Council only a “state of play” was presented to Ministers. At the JHA Council on 12-13 March the Council agreed its general approach. Its position shows some significant differences compared to the initial Commission proposal which, as outlined above, was already unambitious:

o a wide possibility for Member States to introduce exceptions to the application of the right to provisional legal aid for minor offences (not further defined) (Article 2 (3));

o a further possibility for Member States to subject the admission to provisional legal aid to discretionary criteria if this refers to “less serious offences” (once again, undefined) (Article 4 (2bis));

o the elimination of the possibility to access provisional legal aid in European Arrest Warrant proceedings as far as legal assistance in the issuing Member State is concerned (Article 5 (2) of the Commission proposal).

In substance, Member States are left free to define the scope of application of the (limited) right to provisional legal aid, with all but the most serious offences as possible exceptions.

It is difficult, in light of this result, to find any real added value in the text provisionally agreed by the Council. This view is shared by a number of delegations (such as France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium), which, in the course of the Council debate, have made reference to the intention of subscribing a declaration, to be added to the minutes of the Council, in which they express their disappointment. However, these delegations have not blocked the adoption of the general approach, preferring instead to proceed with the legislative procedure and with the negotiations with the European Parliament.

These will be anything but easy: a rapid overview of the amendments tabled by the EP Rapporteur Dennis De Jong (LIBE Committee) and by the other MEPs of the Committee show two widely diverging views of what this Directive should be about. LIBE will vote its “orientation” on April 14 and dialogue can then start. So it is too early to say now if the EP will succeed in enhancing this right (maybe by taking inspiration from the Commission’s Recommendation and translating its content into a binding text).

Reblogged from: http://free-group.eu/2015/03/16/legal-aid-in-criminal-proceedings-will-the-european-parliament-improve-the-councils-general-approach/

 

NOTES

 

Annex

FURTHER READING : Sources of the right to legal aid

The importance of the right to legal aid is linked with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Indeed as an ancillary right, it enshrines the principle of effective judicial protection and the right to access to justice, which is of primary importance in line with Human Rights declarations applicable in Europe.

Because of its ancillary dimension, the respect for the right to legal aid is provided for in a number of international instruments of utmost importance. It is guaranteed by Article 14 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the fundamental principles on which it should be based are outlined in the United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems adopted on 20 December 2012 by the General Assembly.

Article 6 (3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets out a “right to legal assistance where the defendant has insufficient means to pay for legal assistance, and to get free legal aid when the interest of justice so requires”.

Concerning the European Union as such, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Charter has bound the EU institutions. Yet, Article 47(3) of the European Union Charter of Fundamental rights provides that “legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. Even implicitly, the need to provide for legal aid can be drawn from some other dispositions of the Charter such as Art. 48 (2), which states that “Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed”.

Furthermore, the respect for the right to legal aid guaranteed by article 47(3) of the EU Charter has to be understood in light of the ECtHR case-law, which contributes to add to the strict procedural side of legal aid a more substantial element, through the requirement of enabling each suspect to present his or her case properly.

To assess the respect of this requirement, the ECtHR held in the case of Airey v. Ireland that the effectiveness of the right to access to justice throughout the right to free legal aid depends mostly on whether the individual in question would be able to present his/her case properly and satisfactorily without the assistance of a lawyer. Circumstances in which legal representation would be necessary for ensuring access to justice could be the complexity of the procedure before the court of first instance and complexity of the legal points involved. This assessment must also take into account personal circumstances of the applicant and the form of legal aid in question.
Therefore the right to legal aid can be limited as far as it is justified by a legitimate aim and that if there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the limitation and the legitimate aim sought.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

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Denmark and EU Justice and Home Affairs Law: Details of the planned referendum

 

 

Steve Peers

Danish participation in cross-border criminal law measures is symbolised by 'The Bridge', the 'Nordic Noir' series about cross-border cooperation in criminal matters between Denmark and Sweden. But due to the changes in EU law in this field, that cooperation might soon be jeopardised. As a result, in the near future, Denmark will in principle be voting on whether to replace the current nearly complete opt-out on EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law with a partial, selective opt-out. I have previously blogged on the implications of this plan in general terms, but it’s now clear exactly what this vote will be about.

First of all, a short recap of the overall framework (for more detail, see that previous blog post). Back in 1992, Denmark obtained an opt-out from the single currency, defence and aspects of JHA law (it’s widely believed that it also obtained an opt-out from EU citizenship, but this is a ‘Euromyth’). These opt-outs were formalised in the form of a Protocol attached to the EU Treaties as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The JHA opt-out was then amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

At present, Denmark participates in: the EU policing and criminal law measures adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon; measures relating to the Schengen border control system (as  matter of international law, not EU law); the EU rules on visa lists (as a matter of EU law); and the EU’s Dublin rules on allocation of asylum applications, ‘Brussels’ rules on civil jurisdiction and legislation on service of documents (in the form of treaties with the EU). In contrast, Denmark does not – and cannot– participate in other EU rules on immigration and asylum law or cross-border civil law, or policing and criminal law rules adopted since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Protocol on Denmark’s legal position either allows it to repeal its JHA opt-out entirely, or selectively. If it chooses to repeal the opt-out selectively, it would then be able to opt in to JHA measures on a case-by-case basis, like the UK and Ireland, although (unlike those states) it would remain fully bound by the Schengen rules. Indeed, those rules will then apply as a matter of EU law in Denmark, not as a matter of international law.

In practice, while Danish governments have promised for a while to hold a referendum on the JHA opt-out, the concrete plans to hold one in the near future were triggered in light of the planned EU legislation to replace the current rules establishing Europol, the EU police agency, with new legislation (on that proposal, see here).  This led to an agreement between the government parties and several opposition parties (excluding the far-right Danish Peoples’ Party) known as the ‘Agreement on Denmark in Europol’ (for the text, see here). This agreement states that the referendum will take place after the next general election (which must be held by September 2015), and no later than 31 March 2016. The ‘main reason’ for the referendum is to allow Denmark to opt in to the new Europol rules, but the parties also agreed to study whether Denmark should opt in to other EU civil, criminal and policing laws which currently don’t apply. However, the parties agreed that Denmark should not opt in to any EU immigration or asylum law (besides Schengen, which already applies).

This analysis has now been completed (see the text in Danish here), and the parties have agreed that Denmark would apply to opt in to 22 EU laws if the referendum is successful. Conversely, they have agreed not to opt in to 10 other EU laws.

As regards civil cooperation, the parties have agreed to opt in to large majority of EU measures, as regards: insolvency; payment orders; small claims; the European enforcement order; mediation; the Rome Regulation (on conflicts of law concerning contract); the Rome II Regulation (on conflicts of law concerning non-contractual liability); external relations; protection orders; inheritance; maintenance proceedings; parental responsibility; and account preservation orders. It should be noted that changes to the insolvency proceedings regulation are about to be formally adopted, and changes to the small claims rules will likely be agreed later this year; presumably the agreement also entails opt-ins to the existing legislation as amended.

In contrast, the parties agreed not to opt in to legislation on legal aid in cross-border proceedings, or to the Rome III Regulation on conflicts of law in divorce cases. Nor have they agreed yet on whether to opt in to the pending proposals relating to jurisdiction and choice of law over marital property, and the property of civil partnerships, in the event of relationship breakdown. In general, the recent agreement states that decisions to opt in to measures which have not yet been adopted depend on a future consensus of the relevant parties, or endorsement in a general election.

As for policing and criminal law, the parties agree to opt in to all measures concerning substantive criminal law and most measures concerning EU agencies and mutual recognition. In particular, they agree to opt into seven Directives, regarding: the European Investigation Order; protection orders; trafficking in persons; sexual abuse of children; cyber-crime; market abuse; and counterfeiting the euro. Conversely, they rule out opting in to the legislation on crime victims’ rights, the three Directives on suspects’ rights (concerning interpretation and translation, access to a lawyer and the right to information) and the rules on confiscation of criminal assets. They also rule out opting in to the legislation on EU funding in JHA matters.

They have partly agreed on future measures in this field, agreeing to opt in to the Regulations now under discussion on Europol and Eurojust (the EU prosecutors’ agency) and the Directive on passenger name records, but to opt out of the legislation establishing the European Public Prosecutor. The Commission has also proposed legislation on the European Police College, fraud against EU funds and drug trafficking, along with three more suspects’ rights measures (concerning childrens’ rights, the presumption of innocence and legal aid). Decisions on those measures will again depend upon on a future consensus of the relevant parties, or endorsement in a general election.

The parties’ clarification of their intentions provides useful certainty for the Danish public when it has the opportunity to vote on these issues. In general, in criminal matters Denmark would be participating in the EU measures assisting the prosecution, without any counterbalance by means of recent legislation regarding the rights of victims or suspects. Similarly it would still be participating in the Schengen rules on external border controls and the abolition of internal border checks, without any of the accompanying harmonisation of immigration and asylum law that applies to other Schengen States which are EU members. On the whole, Denmark would also be participating in more JHA legislation than the UK and Ireland – not just as regards full participation in Schengen (as is already the case), but also as regards the EU legislation on inheritance, account preservation, investigation orders, market abuse, currency counterfeiting and Eurojust, all of which one or both of the UK and Ireland have opted out of. On the other hand, the UK and Ireland have opted in to the EU legislation on crime victims’ rights, some of the legislation on suspects’ rights and the first phase of EU asylum law. Given that Ireland participates in the single currency, a Danish 'yes' to selective participation in JHA law would cement the UK's position as the chief non-participant in EU laws which bind most other Member States.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

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Does the EU need more anti-terrorist legislation?

 

Steve Peers

In the wake of the appalling attacks in Paris two days ago, it only took 24 hours for the EU Commission to state that it would propose a new wave of EU anti-terrorist measures in a month’s time. It’s not yet known what the content of this law will be; but the very idea of new legislation is a profound mistake.

Of course, it was right for the EU institutions to express sympathy for the victims of the attack, and solidarity as regards defence of free speech. Equally, it would not be problematic to use existing EU anti-terrorism laws if necessary, in order (for instance) to surrender the suspects in this crime on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW), in the event that they fled to another Member State.  The question is whether the EU needs more such laws.

For the EU has already reacted to prior terrorism offences, first as regards 9/11 and then to the atrocities in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. The result is a huge body of anti-terrorism law, catalogued here by the SECILE project. This comprises not only measures specifically concerning terrorism (such as substantive criminal law measures, adopted in 2002 and amended in 2008), but many other measures which make it easier to cooperate as regards terrorism as well as other criminal offences, such as the EAW, the laws on exchange of police information and transmission of evidence across borders, and so on.  

Moreover, there are proposals already under discussion which would apply to terrorism issues (among others), such as a new law on Europol, the EU’s police intelligence agency (discussed here), and proposed EU legislation on the transfer of airlines’ passenger name records(PNR).  

So what new laws is the Commission likely to propose? It may suggest a new version of the data retention Directive, the previous version of which was struck down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) last spring, in the Digital Rights judgment (discussed here). Other ideas under discussion, according to leaked documents (see hereand here) are new laws strengthening mandatory checks at borders .  

Are any of these laws really necessary? Member States can already adopt laws on retention of communications data, pursuant to the EU’s e-privacy directive. As the European Parliament’s legal service has confirmed (see its advice here), if Member States adopt such measures, they will be subject to the constraints of the Digital Rights judgment, which bans mass surveillance carried out in the absence of safeguards to protect privacy. Equally, Member States are free to establish their own PNR systems, in the absence of any EU-wide measure (besides EU treaties with the USA, Canada and Australia on PNR). The question of whether mass surveillance is as such compatible with human rights has already been sent to the CJEU by the European Parliament, which has asked the Court to rule on this issue in the context of the EU/Canada PNR treaty (see discussion here).

It would be possible to adopt new laws calling for systematic border checks in specific cases. In practice, this would likely mean checks on Muslims who are returning after travel to places like Syria. It is questionable whether asking detailed further questions at the external borders will, by itself, really do a lot to prevent terrorism. After all, in the Paris attacks, it unfortunately proved impossible to prevent an apparent terrorist attack despite extensive anti-terrorist legislation on the books, and bodyguards protecting the staff of a known terrorist target.

There’s also a question of principle here. The Paris attacks were directed at free speech: the foundation of liberal democracy. Of course efforts should be stepped up to prevent such attacks from happening again; but existing laws allow for targeted intelligence gathering and sharing already, The Commission’s immediate response reeks of panic. And the direct attack on fundamental democratic principles this week in Paris is precisely the wrong context to consider that new legislation curtailing other fundamental freedoms is limited.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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What just happened? The House of Commons ‘vote’ on the European Arrest Warrant

Steve Peers

Last night, the UK House of Commons voted in favour of the UK opting back in to 35 EU policing and criminal law measures, including the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Or rather, it didn’t: it voted in favour of the UK opting back to 11 such measures, notincluding the EAW. Amid scenes of parliamentary confusion and chaos, it wasn’t quite clear what was going on. This blog post explains exactly what the vote was about.

Background

I wrote a detailed analysis for Statewatch of the UK’s opt back in to EU policing and criminal law measures earlier this year, and I will write an update for this blog in the start of December once all of the final steps in the process are in place. But for now, here is a brief recap, to put last night’s vote in context.

The Treaty of Lisbon sets out a five-year transitional period for EU policing and criminal law measures adopted before that Treaty’s entry into force (1 December 2009). At the end of that period, those measures become subject to the full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, including both references from national courts and the Commission’s power to sue Member States for non-application, or incorrect application, of such measures. The majority of Member States (but not including the UK) had already opted in to the former jurisdiction, but the latter jurisdiction is entirely new.

From the same date, the UK can decide to opt out of all the pre-Lisbon policing and criminal law measures (except for those which have been amended since that Treaty entered into force, which the UK could decide to opt in to or out of individually as each of the amended versions was adopted).  If it exercises this block opt-out, the UK can then choose to opt back in to some of these pre-Lisbon measures individually. The decision on its application will be taken by the Commission or the Council, depending on the type of measure (the Council decides where the measure is linked to the ‘Schengen’ treaty on border controls; the Commission decides on all other matters, including the EAW).

The UK has indeed exercised the block opt-out, and has applied to opt back in to 35 measures, as described above. Last night’s vote was the crucial point at which the House of Commons got to vote on the government’s intentions (the House of Lords will vote shortly). The formal decisions on the opt-in will now be taken by the Commission and Council, probably on December 1.

While EU law sets out the overall procedure relating to the opt-out and opt-in, it doesn’t govern the details of parliamentary scrutiny of the government’s decisions within the UK. That’s a matter for  UK law only. So what exactly happened in the House of Commons last night?

The House of Commons vote

The UK government had long promised that Parliament would get to vote on the decision to opt back in to all of the 35 measures. In the event, the Home Secretary declared that last night’s vote, was in effect politically binding as regards all of these measures. But according to a ruling of the Speaker of the House of Commons, the vote was only legally binding as regards 11 of them.

What did the vote concern exactly? It was on a resolution to approve delegated legislation, ie an individual measure which the UK executive can adopt because a previous Act of Parliament gives it powers to adopt that measure, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Last night’s vote was the key point in that parliamentary scrutiny, as far as the House of Commons was concerned.

The Act of Parliament which gave the government those powers was the European Communities Act, which is the main Act governing the status of EU law in the UK’s national legal order. In particular, section 2(2) of this Act gives the government power to adopt delegated legislation to implement EU obligations, subject to certain limits. That section is very frequently used in practice.

However, it’s never been used before to adopt delegated legislation to implement EU obligations regarding pre-Lisbon policing and criminal law. That’s because it couldn’t be, before December 1 2014. This is due to a limitation in the Act itself. Because policing and criminal law issues were ‘intergovernmental’ (ie essentially decided upon by governments, not the EU institutions) before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, they took a different form, and had a different legal status, than ordinary EU law. To take account of this, the European Communities Act never applied to them until now (when the transitional period ends).  

The exclusion of these measures from the Act is implicit in the definition of EU law in section 1(2) of the Act. In particular, that definition excludes Title VI of the original Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) and Art. 1 of both the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice from its scope. Incidentally, the Act still continues to exclude EU foreign policy measures from its scope.

So what does the delegated act which MPs were voting on do? It takes the form of (UK) Regulations, and is further explained in an explanatory memorandum. It makes changes to UK law which the government deemed were still necessary to ensure that 11 of the 35 Acts which the UK is opting back in to are fully and correctly applied in our domestic law.

Six of those measures concern the UK’s mutual recognition of criminal law decisions adopted by other Member States (and vice versa), as regards: confiscation of assets obtained by crime; freezing of such assets provisionally during an investigation and trial; financial penalties (fines) imposed by courts as a result of a criminal conviction; the transfer of foreign prisoners serving a custodial sentence; general rules on in absentia trials as regards mutual recognition; and the European Supervision order, which permits foreigners to be freed pending trial, provided that their home State agrees to supervise them until they face trial in the country concerned.

Three more measures concern police cooperation. Two of them concern ECRIS, a system for the exchange of criminal records between Member States. The third concerns the so-called ‘Swedish initiative’, which governs requests for other forms of information in individual cases between  national police forces.

The final two measures concern joint investigation teams (groups of police officers from multiple Member States, as well as Europol, the EU police intelligence agency) examining cross-border crimes, and data protection rules applying to cross-border exchange of police information (this is distinct from the EU’s data protection Directive).

The political context

As noted above, the Commons vote applied to all 35 measures in a political sense only, not in a legal sense. Legally speaking, the government did not need parliamentary scrutiny of the opt in to the remaining measures, since there was no need to change UK law in order to apply them. However, the UK had promised such scrutiny nonetheless, leading to the confusion and disappointment of many MPs.

It was clearly right in principle to promise full parliamentary scrutiny of the opt in decision, given the public concern and interest in the issue. So it was wrong not to give full effect to that promise, which could have been implemented (for instance) by holding a vote also on a resolution explicitly concerning the opt in to all 35 measures.

The government may have decided not to do this because it wanted to avoid critics of the EAW trying to amend the resolution to force a vote on the EAW separately. But if there is enough concern in Parliament about the opt in to this particular measure (or any others on the list), then MPs should get the chance to vote on it individually.

One of the consistent problems with EU law in the UK (and to some extent in other Member States as well) is its perceived lack of democratic legitimacy. Often that’s the fault of the EU itself, due to a lack of transparency for instance. But in this case, since only UK law governs the process of parliamentary scrutiny relating to the opt in, it’s entirely the fault of the UK government. The likely result of the decision to limit the scope of parliamentary scrutiny will be to damage the legitimacy of the EU further – and to increase, not reduce, the number of Conservative MPs who are very critical of the EU.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

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