The CJEU transforms family reunion for Turkish citizens

Steve Peers

In this week’s judgment in Dogan, the Court of Justice in effect established a new set of rules for family reunion for most Turkish citizens living in the EU – although those rules will still differ in each Member State.

The case concerned Mrs. Dogan’s application to come to Germany to live with her husband, after spending thirteen (by now sixteen) years apart. She was refused on the grounds that her German language skills were not satisfactory, for even though she passed the relevant language test, her written German was not satisfactory due to illiteracy.

This raised two legal issues. First of all, since her husband ran a business in Germany, did the national rule breach the 1970 Protocol to the EU/Turkey association agreement, which prohibits new restrictions on establishment or the provision of services? Secondly, did the national rules comply with the EU’s family reunion Directive, which permits Member States to require family members to comply with ‘integration measures’?

The Court of Justice decided to answer only the first question. This means that its ruling is only relevant to Turkish nationals, rather than all third-country nationals. Having said that, Turkish nationals make up a large proportion of all third-country nationals in the EU, and the Court’s judgment on this point applies to all Member States, including the UK, Ireland and Denmark, which do not apply the family reunion Directive.

However, it should be noted that the Advocate-General’s opinion also argued that the integration requirement breached the family reunion Directive (see discussion here), and that there is another case before the CJEU which raises this issue (notably the K and A case; see further the Commission's recent guidance on the Directive, discussed here).

The judgment

Previously, the CJEU had held that the standstill on new restrictions on establishment and provision of services was binding, had direct effect, and prevented any new measures making it more difficult to exercise self-employment or provide services. But the previous case law only concerned those persons who were actually self-employed or providing services. Could it extend also to the rules regulating the family members of such persons?

The CJEU said it could. In the Court’s view, where the national law made family reunion ‘difficult or impossible’, the establishment of a self-employed person could be ‘negatively affected, since that person would ‘find himself [or herself] obliged to choose between his [or her] activity in the Member State concerned and his [or her] family life in Turkey’. In this case, the national rule made family reunion more difficult, and so violated the standstill clause.

Finally, the Court noted that a measure infringing the standstill clause could be permissible, if it could be ‘justified by an overriding reason in the public interest’, and was ‘suitable to achieve the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’. In this case, assuming that the objectives of the national law (preventing forced marriages and promoting integration) were overriding reasons in the public interest, the national law failed the proportionality test, since the refusal of an application on linguistic grounds was automatic, without taking account ‘of the specific circumstances of each case’.

Comments

In order to assess the impact of the Court’s ruling, it is necessary first of all to determine its scope. The geographical scope, as noted already, is all Member States. Also, while the family members of Turkish nationals will usually reside in Turkey, the judgment should logically apply also if those family members reside in another third State, or in a Member State. Although in the latter case, it is possible that EU immigration law, such as the long-term residents’ Directive, might also apply, that legislation is without prejudice to more favourable rules in treaties between the EU and third States.

The temporal scope, as established in the previous Dereci case, is 1973 for the first nine Member States (the date of entry into force of the 1970 Protocol to the association agreement), and the date of joining the EU for all other Member States. That means that the national law in force on that date regarding family reunion cannot be made worse for those joining Turkish nationals. Moreover, as established in Toprak and Oguz, if the national law is made more liberalafter that date, the standstill also prevents any reversion to the more restrictive law.

Next, what is the personal scope of the judgment? There are three facets to this issue: the sponsor (ie the Turkish citizen in the EU); the family members who seek to join them; and issues of nationality law.

For the Turkish citizen in the EU, the standstill which the Court discussed here also applies to providers of services, but not (as the Court established in Demirkan) to recipients of services. There is also a parallel standstill relating to Turkish workers: according to Article 13 of Decision 1/80 of the EU/Turkey Association Council, the rules on access to employment of Turkish workers and their family members cannot be made more restrictive either. The case law on this provision (see most recently the Demir judgment) makes clear that the standstill on workers and the standstill on establishment must be interpreted the same way (although for the first nine Member States, the standstill on workers took effect in 1980, rather than 1973). In particular, the standstill on workers applies to measures concerning their first admission. It must logically also apply to rules on the first admission of the worker’s family members, since workers, like self-employed persons, would otherwise face a choice between carrying on with employment in a Member State and enjoying family life in another country.

As for family members, while this case concerned spouses, it would logically apply to any other family member as well (Mrs. Dogan had also originally applied for two of the couple’s four children to be admitted also). Simply put, the Turkish citizen in the EU could equally face a choice between his or her economic activity and family life with unmarried partners, children, parents or other family members as well.

Next, as for issues of nationality, one question is whether the primary right-holder and/or the family members concerned can still rely on the rule, if they are dual citizens of Turkey and another country. This question appeared to be answered by the CJEU in Kahveci and Inan, in which it ruled that dual citizens of Turkey and a Member State can rely on the EU/Turkey association rules. But in the pending case of Demirci, concerning social security, an Advocate-General has recently argued that dual citizens cannot invoke the rules. The CJEU will likely clarify this issue soon.

Another nationality-related question is whether third-country national family members of Turkish nationals (in this context, meaning family members who are not nationals of Turkey or a Member State) are covered by the standstill rules. It is clear that they are, by analogy with the recent judgment in Dulger.

Next, what is the material scope of the judgment? In other words, what type of rules relating to family reunion are covered? The test is whether the national rule makes family reunion difficult or impossible. This is apt to cover waiting periods, in-country applications, income requirements, fees for applications (see the Sahin judgment), age limits for spouses or children, and accommodation or sickness insurance rules. Furthermore, the standstill should equally apply as regards different categories of sponsors: for instance, more favourable rules that apply to groups such as refugees, long-term residents or highly-skilled workers cannot be made more restrictive either.  

Finally, what about the possibility of justification? The CJEU did not rule directly in this case as to whether prevention of forced marriages and integration were possible grounds of justification, although in Demir it ruled that prevention of irregular immigration could be such a ground. An example of a new rule which could surely be justified would be a ban on admission of family members if they have received a five-year prison sentence, as compared to a ten-year threshold previously. On the other hand, it seems doubtful that a national rule which simply aims to reduce the numbers of Turkish persons’ family members entering the country can be justified, in light of the overall objective of the association agreement of eventually providing for free movement of people and preparing for Turkish accession.

In any event, it is clear from the Dogan judgment that even if a new national restriction is justified, refusals cannot be automatic and must take account of individual cases. The requirement that the restrictions be ‘suitable’ also suggests that they must be the only possible means to achieve their end. More generally, it is surely the case that like any derogation from EU law, such restrictions and their application must also be judged in light of the EU Charter, namely the right to family life and rights of the child. 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 24, chapter 26

Read More

Is the European Union an ideal worth dying for? Thoughts on the future of Ukraine and the EU

Steve Peers

Undoubtedly there were many reasons to find fault with the Yanukovych government of Ukraine, but the catalyst for start of the protests which ultimately brought his government down was his refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Some of the protesters killed last week were even flying the Union flag. Let's assume that fresh elections are held, as planned, in the near future (on the same day as the European Parliament elections) and result in a pro-European government. In that case, this apparently strong enthusiasm of a proportion of the Ukrainian population for joining the European Union will raise fundamental questions about the Union's future.

The initial steps following the election will be relatively easy. First of all, the association agreement will be quickly signed and ratified. This treaty goes much further to link Ukraine to the EU's legal order than the prior Europe Agreements (with Central and European countries) did, and the current Stabilisation and Association Agreements (with the Western Balkans) do. In particular, it contains an enormous list of specific EU laws which Ukraine must comply with by certain dates.

Another potential 'early harvest', which would be very popular with the Ukrainian population, would be the abolition of the visa requirement for Ukrainians to visit the EU. There is already a process to this end set up between the EU and Ukraine, and it could certainly result in a successful result in the near future if there is enough effort on the Ukrainian side - as the examples of the Western Balkans and Moldova prove. Various other treaties on specific issues could also be agreed between the EU and Ukraine. Yet I doubt if this will be enough.

The Copenhagen and Thessaloniki declarations, which set out the EU's clear willingness to admit the countries of (respectively) Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans if the relevant conditions are met, have formed the core of the EU's relations with the countries concerned since their adoption. The realistic promise of EU membership for these countries formed the basis of broad and stable political support for widespread economic and political reform.Of course, in some cases, the promise of possible EU accession is not enough to overcome a country's manifold problems, as the example of Bosnia and Hercegovina shows. But it is hard to see how that country would be better off without that promise.

Indeed, the recent history of Ukraine arguably shows that the absence of a commitment by the Union to admit the relevant country in principle potentially weakens the pro-reform forces politically. Following the Orange Revolution of 2004, the EU would not commit to possible enlargement, suggesting instead the close association agreement which has since been negotiated, and pro-reform forces faced difficulties ever since. Of course, the EU's lack of enthusiasm for Ukrainian membership cannot have been the only reason for those difficulties. But again, the pro-reform forces would surely have been better off if that commitment had been made. You cannot build broad and stable political support for widespread economic and political reform around the goal of EU membership when the EU palpably doesn't want your country to join.

So this time, should the EU make a genuine commitment to admit Ukraine if the conditions are right? On the one hand, Ukraine fits the geographic criteria for membership, and has various historical, cultural and linguistic links with current Member States. It's very diverse, and its borders are historically arbitrary, but the same could be said of other Member States (and non-Member States too). If the political and economic circumstances there change, the potential accession process could always be put on hold for as long as necessary, as it has been in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Its accession would be of major strategic importance for the EU, significantly limiting Russia's sphere of influence in Europe.

On the other hand, the Union's elites and its population clearly have 'enlargement fatigue', and Ukraine is bigger, poorer and potentially more volatile than most of the countries which have joined in recent years. The weeks leading up to a European Parliament election are not an ideal time for politicians to consider making such a brave political commitment.

How can these conflicting considerations be reconciled? The Union has gone as far as it can in terms of developing a close association with Ukraine, in the form of the association agreement which will likely soon be signed. More protocols could be added to this treaty, but that would miss the point: pro-reform forces in Ukraine need a concrete commitment to EU membership as an anchor to build broad support for a significant programme of political and economic reform.

What the Union needs, then, is not a new form of association: it is very good at coming up with them, but that won't be sufficient in this case. What it needs instead is a new form of membership. Let's call it 'associate membership' (although that term is bound to be confused in practice with mere association) for convenience's sake.

An associate member would be legally a member of the EU, with many of the rights and obligations of EU membership, but not all of them. For instance, addressing one of the biggest public concerns in current EU Member States, the free movement of people would not fully apply. This is different from the transitional period for free movement of workers that has applied to many EU enlargements, in that there would be no fixed end date for the limitations concerned. Indeed, there would be no legal commitment to admit the country concerned as a full member of the EU, leaving that possibility subject to the current system for agreeing accession of new Member States.

This new possibility need not be confined to Ukraine: it could also be used for Western Balkan states, Turkey and other eastern neighbourhood countries. Indeed, it could also be used for existing Member States which may wish to scale back their current degree of membership in the EU without leaving it altogether. The United Kingdom would be the most obvious candidate for such a change of status, participating perhaps in a 'common market' version of associate membership.

Of course, the associate members could not expect to vote on EU measures which did not apply to them yet (again differentiating them from new full Member States), including any Treaty amendments that did not apply to them. Difficult issues would arise as regards their participation in EU institutions, but these could surely be solved if the political will were present.

Undeniably, this new form of EU membership could only be introduced by way of Treaty amendment, and many Member States dread starting the Treaty amendment process. But, if the political will were there, it would need only a minor amendment to the Treaties to provide for the existence of the new concept, with the details to be worked out in the treaties with the countries concerned, supplemented perhaps by a general legal framework governing the new form of EU membership (to be adopted by the Council or European Council by unanimity, with the consent of the European Parliament). This Treaty amendment could be severed from other possible Treaty amendment issues, reducing the political difficulties in negotiating and ratifying Treaty changes.

Back in 1989, the European Union responded quickly and fully to the end of the Cold War, putting in place a framework for enlargement that ultimately led to the reunification of much of the continent within the EU's legal order. The passion and enthusiasm of pro-European Ukrainians, as well as the Union's need to think creatively about ways to address its relative decline of influence in regional politics, suggest that the time is ripe to create a new form of membership in the European Union.


Barnard & Peers: chapter 2, chapter 24

Read More

The Swiss vote against free movement of people and the implications for the UK's membership of the EU

Steve Peers

There are two implications of the narrow vote in the Swiss referendum to renegotiate treaties with the EU in order to permit a quota on labour migration? First, and most immediately, the vote will affect Swiss relations with the EU. Secondly, the vote foreshadows key aspects of the debate concerning the UK’s relationship with the EU, and the possible renegotiation of EU membership.

The Swiss implications

The details of what the Swiss voted for have been incisively analysed in the Kent EU rights blog post, here: http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/eu-rights-clinic/

So what are the broader implications? There is now a domestic constitutional obligation for the Swiss government to renegotiate its free movement treaty with the EU, so that labour quotas are allowed. Of course, such a renegotiation is technically possible, but will be politically difficult, since the EU insisted upon this treaty as a quid pro quo as part of a broader package that included treaties on six other issues, such as public purchasing and aviation access. The EU can, and probably will, insist on renegotiation of some of these other treaties as a consequence.

The EU should not be criticised if it demands a renegotiation of other treaties, as it had always insisted upon this link, which is set out expressly in all the treaties concerned. The Swiss public was also always aware of it. Indeed, undoubtedly the link with the other treaties explains why the Swiss public has voted for the free movement agreement in three previous referenda (once to approve it initially, and twice to extend it to new Member States). And it is clear that the supporters of a ‘no’ vote in the new referendum made the link clear to the voting public. We must conclude that the narrow majority who voted ‘yes’ thought that this would be a price worth paying.

After all, any agreement contains an element of quid pro quo. For instance, employees might like to be paid even if they don’t work, while employers might prefer it if employees worked without pay. Obviously both sides compromise; and a ‘pick-and-choose’ approach will have consequences. If employees start working for 3 days a week instead of 5, they won’t still receive full-time pay.

The implications for the UK

When re-negotiating with Switzerland, at least some Member States will be thinking about the UK. While it used to be the case that the cost of the UK’s net contribution to the EU was the main cause for Eurosceptics, that has been joined first by doubts about the EU’s democratic legitimacy and second by concerns about large-scale immigration from new Member States. Could the UK hold a referendum like Switzerland’s?

Legally speaking, no. The UK does not have a specific free movement agreement with the EU (linked to other treaties) like Switzerland does. Rather, free movement is part and parcel of our membership of the EU. If we want to be rid of it, we either have to renegotiate our entire membership or leave the EU. As a matter of domestic law, we could hold a referendum or otherwise change the free movement rules, and breach EU law while remaining a Member. But that course would be dishonest and disreputable. If the majority of the British people don’t like a key aspect of our arrangement with the EU, we should either leave or try to change that arrangement, while being aware of the consequences of doing so.

So we could ask to renegotiate our membership as far as free movement of people is concerned (among other things, of course). This is legally possible, but politically even more difficult than the Swiss case. Indeed, as I suggested already, the negotiations with Switzerland could serve as a proxy for the possible future negotiation with the UK – much as any EU negotiations concerning an independent Scotland would be a proxy for many Member States’ concerns about their separatist movements. Spanish politicians look at Edinburgh, and think of Barcelona.

It seems likely, then, that we are about to witness a ‘dry run’ for a possible British renegotiation process. This will provide a useful laboratory to test the theory that renegotiating the UK’s EU membership, or the UK leaving the EU, would only have (in Eurosceptics’ view) positive consequences for the UK.  


Barnard & Peers: Chapter 24

Read More